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MONOPOLIZING FREE SPEECH 
Gregory Day* 
 
The First Amendment prevents the government from suppressing speech, 
though individuals can ban, chill, or abridge free expression without 
offending the Constitution.  Hardly an unintended consequence, Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously likened free speech to a marketplace where 
the responsibility of rejecting dangerous, repugnant, or worthless speech lies 
with the people.  This supposedly maximizes social welfare on the theory that 
the market promotes good ideas and condemns bad ones better than the state 
can.  Nevertheless, there is a concern that large technology corporations 
exercise unreasonable power in the marketplace of ideas. 
Because “big tech’s” ability to abridge speech lacks constitutional 
obstacles, many litigants, politicians, and commentators have recently begun 
to claim that the act of suppressing speech is anticompetitive and thus should 
offend the antitrust laws.  Their theory, however, seems contrary to antitrust 
law.  Since antitrust is intended to promote consumer welfare in commercial 
markets, antitrust liability is typically reserved for firms that have harmed 
consumers economically.  This generally requires showing higher prices or 
restricted output.  As such, the courts have largely declared that speech 
entails noncommercial activity antitrust has no authority to govern, despite 
the emergence of rhetoric and lawsuits seeking to do just that. 
This Article argues that, contrary to precedent, antitrust law can and 
should promote commercial speech.  The economy has evolved such that 
firms and consumers depend on information, ideas, and speech even when 
traded at zero prices—known as the “information economy.”  In turn, 
technology firms encounter incentives to suppress types of commercial 
speech and, when wielding market power, the ability to do so.  For example, 
Apple and Google allegedly bury information, advertising, and other forms 
of commercial expression about rival products to achieve anticompetitive 
ends, harming consumers and markets.  This Article asserts that in certain 
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instances, enforcement should condemn the exclusion of commercial 
information even when consumers enjoy low prices while resisting the 
emergence of rhetoric calling for the integration of all types of speech—e.g., 
expressive, political, and social speech—into antitrust’s framework.  If 
antitrust promoted noncommercial speech, it would erode the First 
Amendment as well as antitrust law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Modern First Amendment1 theory likens free expression to a competitive 
marketplace.2  This framework, which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
asserted in Abrams v. United States,3 assumes that abridging free speech 
tends to inflict greater costs on society than allowing repugnant ideas to 
proliferate.4  For historical examples supporting this framework, 
governments have banned literary treasures,5 scientific theories,6 political 
thought,7 and exercises of the free press,8 stunting social and economic 
growth.  To avoid the dangers of improvident regulation, Justice Holmes 
insisted that the market should determine the value of expression rather than 
the government.9  Since market forces should naturally favor good ideas over 
bad ones, a competitive marketplace of ideas is expected to produce 
innovative art, music, technology, journalism, research, and political theory, 
among other forms of expression. 
Yet only in the past few years have observers become seriously concerned 
that powerful corporations—whose conduct lies outside of the First 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a 
redress of grievances.”). 
 2. Lucien J. Dhooge, The First Amendment and Disclosure Regulations:  Compelled 
Speech or Corporate Opportunism?, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 599, 604 (2014); see also Joseph 
Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 823–24 (2008) (discussing 
how Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes “revolutionized” First Amendment jurisprudence). 
 3. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 4. See Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 1, 24–29 (1986) (discussing the error costs of overregulating speech). 
 5. Banned Books Week:  Books That Shaped America, EAGLE (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://www.theeagle.com/gallery/featured/banned-books-week-books-that-shaped-america/ 
collection_e1dc7aa8-a3af-11e7-9825-aba3b5eecab5.html [https://perma.cc/G44S-XCPH] 
(discussing great literary works that society has at one time banned). 
 6. Michael Zimmerman, Yet Another Call to Ban the Teaching of Evolution:  Bad for 
Science, Worse for Religion, and Legally Embarrassing, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 27, 2013, 
5:28 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-zimmerman/yet-another-call-to-ban-
t_b_3810327.html [https://perma.cc/C2CV-42NE]. 
 7. Rebecca Shapiro, Arkansas Lawmaker Introduces Bill Banning Howard Zinn Books, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 6, 2017, 5:11 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/arkansas-
lawmaker-introduces-bill-banning-howard-zinn-books-from-public-schools_us_ 
58bd2365e4b0b9989418716e [https://perma.cc/8RC2-VNKQ] (discussing a proposed bill by 
an Arkansas legislator to ban schools from teaching books by the liberal historian Howard 
Zinn). 
 8. Editorial Board, India’s Battered Free Press, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/opinion/india-freedom-of-press-narendra-modi.html 
[https://perma.cc/4FVC-BS2E]. 
 9. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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Amendment’s scope10—may threaten free speech.11  In prior generations, it 
was generally assumed that private parties lacked the capacity to suppress 
content12 and that their right to advocate for or against certain viewpoints 
was precisely how the market was supposed to determine an idea’s merits.13  
Today, though, many worry that telecommunications, media, technology, 
social media, and other large corporations (“big tech” or “tech giants”) can, 
in exploiting their market power, impede the free trade of ideas.14  Consider 
Facebook, Twitter, and other firms that offer users a platform to express 
opinions, share stories, and debate issues.  By controlling a lion’s share of 
the market, critics contend that each company has the power and incentives 
to suppress ideas and speakers.15  For example, Google allegedly excludes 
not only political viewpoints with which it disagrees16 but also information 
about commercial goods in competition against its own products.17  As one 
observer lamented about Google’s ability to alter or censor speech: 
Google has given [its Vice President and Deputy General Counsel] Nicole 
Wong a central role in . . . decid[ing] what controversial material does and 
doesn’t appear on the local search engines that Google maintains in many 
countries in the world, as well as on Google.com.  As a result, Wong and 
 
 10. The current view of the First Amendment is that it applies only to state actors. Halleck 
v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300, 307 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[W]hether the First 
Amendment applies to the individuals who have taken the challenged actions . . . depends on 
whether they have a sufficient connection to governmental authority to be deemed state 
actors.”); see also Robert R. Baugh, Applying the Bill of Rights to the States:  A Response to 
William P. Gray, Jr., 49 ALA. L. REV. 551, 555 (1998). 
 11. See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH:  THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 
121–23 (2010) (noting that people often mistake the First Amendment as a plenary protection 
of speech); Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1115, 1121 (2005) (“[T]oday private actors wield the vast majority of power over 
Internet speech—power unchecked by the First Amendment.”). 
 12. See Adams v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 400 F. Supp. 219, 223 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (casting doubt 
on the idea that private parties can even monopolize or suppress an idea). 
 13. Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the 
Private Sector:  With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1552 (1998). 
 14. See, e.g., Mark Scott, Welcome to New Era of Global Digital Censorship, POLITICO 
(Jan. 14, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/google-facebook-twitter-censorship-
europe-commission-hate-speech-propaganda-terrorist [https://perma.cc/XR22-5DH3]. 
 15. See, e.g., Kalev Leetaru, How Twitter’s New Censorship Tools Are the Pandora’s Box 
Moving Us Towards the End of Free Speech, FORBES (Feb. 17, 2017, 12:02 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2017/02/17/how-twitters-new-censorship-tools-
are-the-pandoras-box-moving-us-towards-the-end-of-free-speech/ [https://perma.cc/5GW2-
P936]; Emma Woollacott, Facebook Reveals Its Secret Rules for Censoring Posts, FORBES 
(Apr. 24, 2018, 8:37 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2018/04/24/ 
facebook-reveals-its-secret-rules-for-censoring-posts/ [https://perma.cc/25Y5-JSB7]. 
 16. Vivian Salama et al., Trump Accuses Google of Suppressing Positive News About His 
Presidency, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 28, 2018, 3:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-
accuses-google-of-suppressing-positive-news-about-his-presidency-1535459748 
[https://perma.cc/E99X-KGVU]. 
 17. Jacob Brogan, Why the EU Just Slapped Google with a $2.7 Billion Fine, SLATE (June 
27, 2017, 5:20 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2017/06/why-the-european-union-fined-
google-2-7-billion.html [https://perma.cc/PQ8P-XANR]. 
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her colleagues arguably have more influence over the contours of online 
expression than anyone else on the planet.18 
To critics then, a mix of technology and market power enables or even 
encourages powerful corporations to obstruct free speech as a means of 
attracting consumers and generating revenue. 
Curiously, some litigants are beginning to suggest that the Sherman 
Antitrust Act19 should condemn efforts to abridge speech20—a notion that is 
seemingly antithetical to antitrust law.21  Their theory is that, since antitrust’s 
purpose is to protect the competitive process from monopolies and trade 
restraints,22 a monopolist who employs anticompetitive tactics to suppress 
speech should incur antitrust liability.23  Several recent lawsuits illustrate this 
approach.  In 2018, Gab AI alleged that Google offended antitrust law by 
excluding specific viewpoints from internet discourse.24  Gab, a social media 
company catering to the “alt-right,”25 claimed it was denied access to 
Google’s Android platform due to its political leanings, resulting in 
“inhibit[ed] free speech” among other anticompetitive effects.26  Similar 
antitrust lawsuits27 include former candidate Gary Johnson’s claim that the 
 
 18. Jeffrey Rosen, Google’s Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/magazine/30google-t.html [https://perma.cc/XN2J-
SSZY]. 
 19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018). 
 20. See Jeremy Carl, How to Break Silicon Valley’s Anti-Free-Speech Monopoly, NAT’L 
REV. (Aug. 15, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/08/silicon-valleys-
anti-conservative-bias-solution-treat-major-tech-companies-utilities/ [https://perma.cc/ 
RUC5-P8U9] (discussing how Google and its subsidiary YouTube have exercised such 
control over the internet’s flow of information that, according to critics, the companies can 
alter political discourse); April Glaser, The Alt-Right’s Favorite Social Network Has a Point 
About Google, SLATE (Sept. 20, 2017, 3:52 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2017/09/gab-
is-suing-google-over-antitrust-and-it-has-a-point.html [https://perma.cc/9U8D-FYL2]. 
 21. See infra Part II (discussing why antitrust is thought to be unable to govern speech). 
 22. Jennifer R. Conners, Comment, A Critical Misdiagnosis:  How Courts Underestimate 
the Anticompetitive Implications of Hospital Mergers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 543, 545 (2003) 
(“The purpose of antitrust law is to protect the consumer by promoting free competition, which 
fosters lower prices and higher quality.”). 
 23. Johnson v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 869 F.3d 976, 979–80 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(ruling that antitrust cannot govern political discourse). 
 24. Complaint at 42, Gab AI Inc. v. Google, LLC, No. 2:17-cv-04115-AB (E.D. Pa. Sept. 
14, 2017), ECF No. 1. 
 25. Defining “alt-right” is incredibly difficult given the external and internal debates about 
what constitutes this ideology.  According to The Atlantic, “[t]he most influential account 
included in the data set of alt-right Twitter followers was that of Richard Spencer, the avowed 
white nationalist who coined the term alt-right.” J. M. Berger, Trump Is the Glue That Binds 
the Far Right, ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/ 
2018/10/trump-alt-right-twitter/574219/ [https://perma.cc/9YUY-DB3D]. 
 26. Id.; see also Harper Neidig, Social App Popular with ‘Alt-Right’ Files Antitrust 
Lawsuit Against Google, HILL (Sept. 15, 2017, 1:21 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/ 
technology/350885-gab-files-antitrust-lawsuit-against-google [https://perma.cc/W767-
NYBW]. 
 27. Other lawsuits include allegations made by documentarians that major television 
networks colluded to muzzle their works, Levitch v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 697 F.2d 
495, 495–96 (2d Cir. 1983) and the claim that a newspaper monopolized local news by 
depriving rival outlets of advertising revenue. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 
143, 148 (1951). 
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Commission on Presidential Debates used its monopoly power to exclude 
third-party viewpoints from the 2016 presidential debates28 and litigation 
against the major credit companies alleging that their treatment of WikiLeaks 
and its affiliates “suppress[ed] the market place [sic] of ideas” in violation of 
antitrust law.29 
Moreover, antitrust’s relationship with speech has emerged as a salient 
political issue, gaining traction among both political parties and multiple 
branches of government.  According to Senators Elizabeth Warren and Ted 
Cruz, platforms like Facebook have created such a chokepoint on 
information that antitrust regulators should intervene.30  Also take the debate 
over regulating the internet:  some lawmakers argue in favor of abolishing 
“net neutrality” on the grounds that antitrust law is the superior guardian of 
online expression.31  Recently, in fact, the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) suggested that antitrust should protect a “greater 
openness and free speech” as a benefit of competition.32  Unsurprisingly, it 
has become commonplace to find editorials and articles in the New York 
Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, and other news outlets 
 
 28. Johnson, 869 F.3d at 979–80. 
 29. DataCell ehf. v. Visa, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-1658 GBL/TCB, 2015 WL 4624714, at *6 
(E.D. Va. July 30, 2015) (“Here, DataCell attempts to allege an injury in fact in two ways.  
First, DataCell alleges that Defendants ‘injured the media market by suppressing the market 
place [sic] of ideas.’”). 
 30. Jessica Guynn, Ted Cruz Threatens to Regulate Facebook, Google, and Twitter over 
Charges of Anti-conservative Bias, USA TODAY (Apr. 10, 2019, 3:41 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2019/04/10/ted-cruz-threatens-regulate-facebook-
twitter-over-alleged-bias/3423095002/ [https://perma.cc/HZ4T-LDRU]; see also infra notes 
219–30, 295 and accompanying text. 
 31. Examples of advocacy in favor of using antitrust law instead of net neutrality include 
the submissions from an Federal Trade Commission (FTC) commissioner and a representative 
from Congress. See generally Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Antitrust over Net Neutrality:  Why We 
Should Take Competition in Broadband Seriously, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 119 (2016); Bob 
Goodlatte, Use Antitrust Laws, Not Regulations to Protect the Internet, HILL (Sept. 16, 2014, 
12:46 PM), http://thehill.com/special-reports/net-neutrality-september-16-2014/217862-use-
antitrust-laws-not-regulations-to [https://perma.cc/23JB-GP5N]. 
 32. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks 
at the Antitrust New Frontiers Conference:  “. . . And Justice for All”:  Antitrust Enforcement 
and Digital Gatekeepers (June 11, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-
attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-antitrust-new-frontiers [https://perma.cc/ 
9SR5-TKTQ] [hereinafter Delrahim, Digital Gatekeepers]; see Makan Delrahim, Deputy 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the Recording Artists’ 
Coalition:  Antitrust Enforcement in the Entertainment and Media Industries (Dec. 18, 2003), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/antitrust-enforcement-entertainment-and-media-
industries [https://perma.cc/KX5K-UB58] [hereinafter Delrahim, Entertainment Industry 
Enforcement]; see also, e.g., N.Y. Citizens Comm. on Cable TV v. Manhattan Cable TV, Inc., 
651 F. Supp. 802, 818–19 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (issuing an injunction to promote “more than one 
speaker” in the monopolized market of pay television); Alec Klein, A Hard Look at Media 
Mergers, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2000), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/ 
2000/11/29/a-hard-look-at-media-mergers/d8380c2d-92ee-4b1b-8ffd-f43893ab0055/ 
[https://perma.cc/5CS9-HJ9G] (FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky stated that “[a]ntitrust is more 
than economics . . . .  I do believe if you have issues in the newspaper business, in book 
publishing, news generally, entertainment, I think you want to be more careful and thorough 
in your investigation than if the very same problems arose in cosmetics, or lumber, or coal 
mining.”). 
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discussing whether antitrust regulators should promote free speech against 
restraints erected by big tech.33 
Yet there are great reasons to doubt whether antitrust law has any authority 
to promote free expression, notwithstanding the rise of lawsuits and policy 
proposals meant to do just that.34  The obstacle involves antitrust’s limited 
scope.  Antitrust law was reformed in the 1970s and 1980s so that, today, it 
may only promote the economic benefits of competition; social and political 
goals can no longer instigate enforcement.35  In turn, to state an antitrust 
claim, plaintiffs must generally show that the challenged act increased prices 
or restricted output, thereby harming consumer welfare.36  Perhaps because 
abridging speech is unlikely to affect consumer prices, courts have ruled that 
the marketplace of ideas is noneconomic in nature and thus excluded from 
antitrust’s scope.37  So given antitrust’s economic foundation, the modern 
view is that a firm may freely suppress ideas, speech, and expression without 
incurring antitrust liability. 
In fact, the limited scholarship linking antitrust to free expression has 
typically highlighted the corollary:  the First Amendment is more aptly used 
to escape antitrust liability.  A core tenet of the First Amendment is that 
speakers may discriminate against ideas and expressions with which they 
disagree.38  As such, the more natural argument is that the First Amendment 
 
 33. See, e.g., Gerrit De Vynck & David McLaughlin, Big Tech Is Armed and Waiting to 
Repel U.S. Antitrust Onslaught, BLOOMBERG (June 6, 2019, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-06/big-tech-is-armed-and-waiting-to-
repel-u-s-antitrust-onslaught [https://perma.cc/KD65-M85A]; Mark Epstein, Opinion, 
Antitrust, Free Speech and Google, WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2019, 3:31 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/antitrust-free-speech-and-google-11560108712 [https:// 
perma.cc/83F7-8PYV]; David Streitfeld, To Take Down Big Tech, They First Need to Reinvent 
the Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/technology/tech-
giants-antitrust-law.html [https://perma.cc/H886-F5XD]. 
 34. See generally Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Why More Antitrust Immunity 
for the Media Is a Bad Idea, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2011) (advocating that free 
speech issues should receive antitrust immunity); see also infra notes 110–21 (describing 
cases in which courts have refused to subject markets of ideas and information to antitrust 
scrutiny). 
 35. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE:  PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 
2 (2005) (asserting that since antitrust’s “counterrevolution of the 1970s and 1980s,” “[t]he 
only articulated goal of the antitrust laws is to benefit consumers, who are best off when 
markets are competitive”). 
 36. See Ginzburg v. Mem’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 998, 1026 (S.D. Tex. 1997) 
(“To determine the legality of a restraint under the rule of reason, the plaintiff must show that 
the ‘defendant’s actions amounted to a conspiracy against the market—a concerted attempt to 
reduce output and drive up prices or otherwise reduce consumer welfare.’”). 
 37. See, e.g., DataCell ehf. v. Visa, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-1658 GBL/TCB, 2015 WL 
4624714, at *7 (E.D. Va. July 30, 2015) (dismissing the plaintiff’s antitrust lawsuit because 
its claim that the defendant’s conduct harmed the “market for ideas” fails to state an economic 
injury and noting that “Congress created antitrust laws to protect free market competition”). 
 38. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 
(1995) (holding that Massachusetts may not, on First Amendment grounds, force a private 
parade to include messages that the organizers would prefer to exclude).  Key was the notion 
that “one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to 
speak may also decide ‘what not to say.’” Id. (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986)). 
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confers a limited grant of antitrust immunity to exclude content and 
speakers.39  This makes antitrust’s emergence as a tool to combat censorship 
especially surprising. 
The question of whether antitrust should promote free expression 
implicates a burgeoning debate over antitrust’s purpose.40  Scholars and 
observers have begun to criticize antitrust’s fixation with prices as the chief 
indicator of consumer welfare.41  The courts took the position that free 
expression is noncommercial and thus beyond antitrust’s scope when the 
economy prioritized physical goods sold at retail prices.42  This is no longer 
the case.  Today, intangible goods, speech, and information43 exchanged at 
low prices or for “free”44 are central to the “information economy.”45  Due 
to this development, it might be outdated to presume that high prices remain 
the chief harm of concentrated markets.46  As one observer argued, antitrust’s 
reliance on prices “fails to capture the architecture of market power in the 
twenty-first century marketplace.”47  But to most scholars, antitrust law is ill-
equipped to remedy the social harms caused by powerful corporations.  To 
them, issues of democracy, equality, and free expression are best excluded 
from antitrust’s scope.48  It is thus timely and important to question whether 
promoting speech should entail a component of antitrust’s consumer welfare 
standard. 
To foreshadow this Article’s argument, antitrust should foster commercial 
speech but not social, political, and other noncommercial expression.  Given 
information’s role in modern markets, firms encounter incentives to suppress 
commercial expression and, when wielding market power, the capability to 
do so.  For example, Amazon and Google allegedly bury information about 
competing products to promote their own goods, preventing rivals from 
 
 39. See Raymond Ku, Antitrust Immunity, the First Amendment and Settlements:  
Defining the Boundaries of the Right to Petition, 33 IND. L. REV. 385, 385–86 (2000) 
(discussing situations in which the First Amendment immunizes conduct from antitrust 
scrutiny). 
 40. See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 716–
17 (2017) (questioning whether antitrust’s fixation on prices can appreciate the harm Amazon 
poses to consumers). 
 41. Id. (questioning whether antitrust must evolve to accomplish more than competitive 
prices). 
 42. See, e.g., Adams v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 400 F. Supp. 219, 221–22 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (holding 
that the marketplace of ideas is excluded from antitrust’s framework). 
 43. Kristen Osenga, Information May Want to Be Free, but Information Products Do Not:  
Protecting and Facilitating Transactions in Information Products, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2099, 
2099 (2009) (defining information goods as “products that are used to organize, provide 
context, and distribute information”). 
 44. See John M. Newman, The Myth of Free, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 513, 515–16 (2018) 
(explaining that free goods are rarely free in actuality). 
 45. See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED (Mar. 1, 1994, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/1994/03/economy-ideas [https://perma.cc/XH2L-LGU8] (explaining 
the economic evolution of ideas). 
 46. See Khan, supra note 40, at 716–17 (discussing the obsolescence of prices). 
 47. Id. at 716. 
 48. See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 716 
(2018) (arguing against applying antitrust to noneconomic goals and problems). 
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speaking and competing.49  Google, in dominating online advertising, faces 
accusations that it silences the advertisements of competitors.50  It is 
important to emphasize the market shares that certain tech giants possess over 
the contours of information:  Google controls 92 percent of the search 
market,51 Facebook claims about 64 percent of social media traffic,52 
Amazon dominates e-commerce,53 73 percent of video sharing flows through 
YouTube,54 Netflix commands the market for movie/television streaming, 
and some observers consider the combination of AT&T and Time Warner to 
have a collective monopoly over internet traffic.55  With their market shares, 
tech giants could potentially exclude competition and thereby suppress 
commercial speech and information. 
The problem with this landscape, as argued herein, is that markets and 
consumers depend on the free trade of information.  According to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, commercial speech is constitutionally protected because it 
enables consumers to make informed decisions.56  Absent sufficient 
information, economists assert that consumers are likely to misallocate 
resources in a manner resulting in market failure.57  Recognizing the 
economic role of information, competition is essential; as firms vie for 
consumers, they typically disseminate information about their own products 
as well as goods pushed by their competitors.58  Notwithstanding 
competition’s relationship with information, courts have largely ruled that 
speech is beyond antitrust’s scope, which enables firms to abridge expression 
without fear of antitrust liability.59  This Article argues that, since the First 
 
 49. Joseph Hicks, Google May Be Favoring Its Own Search Ads over Competitors, Report 
Says, FORTUNE (Jan. 20, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/01/20/google-search-engine-
advertising-ads/ [https://perma.cc/PJ3Y-G33K]. 
 50. Matt Binder, Google Hit with $1.7 Billion Fine for Anticompetitive Ad Practices, 
MASHABLE (Mar. 20, 2019), https://mashable.com/article/google-eu-antitrust-fine-ads/ 
[https://perma.cc/CU4Q-FVY5]. 
 51. Jeff Desjardins, How Google Retains More Than 90% of Market Share, BUS. INSIDER 
(Apr. 23, 2018, 7:35 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-google-retains-more-than-
90-of-market-share-2018-4 [https://perma.cc/7BFC-CHUQ]. 
 52. Social Media Stats Worldwide, STATCOUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.com/social-
media-stats [https://perma.cc/W8YW-L9D2] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020). 
 53. Angus Loten, Amazon Owns Nearly Half the Public-Cloud Market, MARKETWATCH 
(July 30, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/amazon-owns-nearly-half-
the-public-cloud-market-2019-07-30 [https://perma.cc/BUJ4-8Y2U]. 
 54. YouTube, DATANYZE, https://www.datanyze.com/market-share/online-video/youtube 
-market-share [https://perma.cc/HYA9-XKWZ] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020). 
 55. Tim Wu, Opinion, Why Blocking the AT&T–Time Warner Merger Might Be Right, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/09/opinion/att-time-warner-
merger-fcc.html [https://perma.cc/8YAA-M75V]. 
 56. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 760, 
769 (1976). 
 57. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty:  A Unified Theory of 
Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 727 (1997) (describing 
imperfect information as “perhaps the most important single market failure”); infra notes 201–
11 and accompanying text. 
 58. See generally Gregory Day & Abbey Stemler, Infracompetitive Privacy, 105 IOWA L. 
REV. 61 (2019). 
 59. See infra Part II. 
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Amendment protects commercial speech for the same reasons that antitrust 
law promotes competition—to benefit consumers and markets—commercial 
speech should receive antitrust protection as a function of competition. 
The following analysis also shows that recent proposals introduced by 
politicians to condemn forms of social and political censorship are misguided 
and probably unconstitutional, as private parties must enjoy the right to reject 
bad, dangerous, and unsavory speech.  Also, expanding enforcement into 
noneconomic realms such as political speech would create unpredictable and 
devastating liability.  If antitrust law promoted noncommercial speech, it 
would erode the First Amendment as well as the antitrust laws. 
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Since antitrust law is an economic 
doctrine, Part I examines free expression as an economic phenomenon.  It 
emphasizes the constitutional limitations placed on the state’s ability to 
abridge speech as well as the lack of counterpart regulations—constitutional 
or otherwise—relevant to private actors.  Part II explores the manner in which 
antitrust law has been reformed to promote the economic interests of 
consumers; in light of this narrowing, the courts have determined that free 
expression lies outside of antitrust’s scope.  Part III discusses changes to the 
economic and political landscapes that call into question antitrust’s 
framework.  After tracing recent rhetoric that seeks to condemn internet 
censorship as anticompetitive, this Part shows that practical and 
constitutional issues cast doubt on whether antitrust has any ability to 
promote free speech.  Part IV proposes a solution that would remedy the 
consequences of modern monopolies without burdening the First 
Amendment:  enforcement should promote commercial expression while 
remaining agnostic to political, social, and expressive speech.  Incorporating 
commercial expression into enforcement would 1) update antitrust law to 
account for zero-priced ideas, information, and speech while retaining 
antitrust’s economic framework; 2) advance antitrust’s purpose of promoting 
efficient markets and consumer welfare; and 3) resist recent efforts by 
politicians and lawmakers to chip away at the First Amendment.  Part V 
analyzes other antitrust remedies proposed by politicians, commentators, and 
scholars, which are ostensibly intended to promote free expression. 
I.  THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
The First Amendment prevents the government from regulating, banning, 
or chilling free expression.60  Less understood, however, is the manner in 
which private actors may create the same harms.  Because latter parts of this 
Article rely on economic theory—as antitrust law is an economic doctrine—
this Part establishes the market theory of speech in order to shed light on the 
incentives encountered by private actors to abridge free expression and the 
consequences thereof. 
 
 60. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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A.  The Economic Framework of Constitutionally Protected Speech 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dissent in Abrams marks one of the first 
portrayals in Supreme Court jurisprudence of speech as a market 
phenomenon.61  Since, prior to World War II, the courts interpreted the 
Constitution as sheltering far fewer types of expression,62 Holmes’s dissent 
sought to expand the First Amendment by arguing that bad ideas pose little 
danger because good ideas should prevail over them.63  Justice Holmes wrote 
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that 
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which 
their wishes safely can be carried out.  That at any rate is the theory of our 
Constitution.64 
Given this framework, most laws abridging political, social, or expressive 
speech today must overcome the formidable hurdle of strict scrutiny—that 
is, the restriction must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling 
government interest.65 
In light of Abrams, a handful of scholars have sought to explore Justice 
Holmes’s metaphor in market terms by probing the benefits of free 
expression and the costs of restricting it.66  As for the benefits, unregulated 
speech should not only reveal the value of ideas but also elevate good ones 
over bad ones.67  Joseph Blocher found in referencing neoclassical economic 
theory that “[b]ad ideas should be no more feared than bad products or 
services; they will simply lose out to better competitors.”68  Taken a step 
further, since commodities gravitate to their highest rate of return,69 
participants have incentives to capture this value by offering actual 
 
 61. THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT:  HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS 
MIND—AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 3–5 (2013) (explaining that, 
before Holmes’s Abrams dissent influenced First Amendment jurisprudence, the belief was 
that the First Amendment protected only against prior restraints, meaning one had the right to 
express a viewpoint but could still be punished for it). 
 62. See id. at 3. 
 63. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. (emphasis added). 
 65. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (“Because the Town’s 
Sign Code imposes content-based restrictions on speech, those provisions can stand only if 
they survive strict scrutiny, ‘which requires the Government to prove that the restriction 
furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’” (quoting 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010))). 
 66. See generally Posner, supra note 4, at 8 (placing free expression in an economic 
framework). 
 67. See Blocher, supra note 2, at 829–30. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Helen A. Garten, Whatever Happened to Market Discipline of Banks?, 1991 ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 749, 749 n.1 (“Simply put, in a perfect market, investors will choose the 
alternative offering the highest rate of return for any desired level of risk, or the lowest risk 
for any given level of return.”); see also Christine M. Augustyniak, Note, Economic Valuation 
of Services Provided by Natural Resources:  Putting a Price on the “Priceless,” 45 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 389, 392 (1993) (describing the common method of determining a good’s value in the 
market). 
1326 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
commodities and services based on superior ideas.70  Consider the press, for 
example; pecuniary rewards motivate journalists to uncover government 
scandals and other noteworthy stories.71  Free speech is thus expected to 
foster industries in which ideas trade, spawning superior books, movies, art, 
scientific theories, and journalism. 
As for the dangers, speech regulation can inflict heavy costs on society 
despite whatever benefits are possible.  Each time the government enacts 
rules meant to limit, ban, or chill types of speech, it may intentionally or 
accidentally condemn meritorious ideas.72  Because overregulating 
expression can generate costs in excess of the benefits, scholars have 
concluded that “when the state censors information, the results are usually 
bad.”73  Richard Posner74 and Ronald Coase75 have noted that the error 
term—i.e., the odds of accidentally banning important speech—is 
significant.  For instance, societies have impeded scientific development in 
the fields of physics, biology, and astronomy by banning ideas in tension 
with the status quo.76  Take the Catholic Church, which condemned Galileo 
for advancing theories in conflict with Psalm 50:1.77 
However, the application of economic models to speech is not without 
criticism.  Michael Rushton78 and Darren Bush79 have each claimed that 
 
 70. See Michael Rushton, Economic Analysis of Freedom of Expression, 21 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 693, 693 (2005) (“To be sure, there are markets in artistic and intellectual products, 
whether songs, performances, books, or patents; these are true markets in the sense of 
exchanges taking place between buyers and sellers.”). 
 71. See generally JAMES T. HAMILTON, DEMOCRACY’S DETECTIVES:  THE ECONOMICS OF 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (2016) (presenting a market-based explanation of journalism and 
its societal benefits). 
 72. See Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable 
Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 9 (2011) (“Regulations likely 
to distort the marketplace of ideas impose particularly heavy costs to First Amendment values, 
thereby requiring particularly powerful justifications.”). 
 73. Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 105 CALIF. L. 
REV. 335, 339 (2017). 
 74. Posner, supra note 4, at 24–25 (asserting that political speech, in particular, is likely 
to be overregulated since judges may be adverse to revolutionary ideas despite their 
desirability). 
 75. Ronald Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3–6 (1964) (noting 
that the government is thought to be prone to overregulating commercial speech). 
 76. See, e.g., 1925 Tenn. Pub. Acts 50 (repealed 1967) (a state law banning the teaching 
of evolution). 
 77. See Alan Cowell, After 350 Years, Vatican Says Galileo Was Right:  It Moves, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 31, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/31/world/after-350-years-vatican-
says-galileo-was-right-it-moves.html [https://perma.cc/2R39-7UE2].  See generally THE 
GALILEO AFFAIR:  A DOCUMENT HISTORY (Maurice A. Finocchiaro trans., 1989). 
 78. Rushton, supra note 70, at 719 (“Coase and Rasmusen’s failure to acknowledge that 
there is more at stake than willingness-to-pay for rights, or even to consider liberal objections, 
gives a false impression of the mainstream of economic analysis.  However, there is a deeper 
problem:  economic analysis alone cannot justify a method of excluding any concerns on 
which we cannot place an economic value.”). 
 79. Darren Bush, The “Marketplace of Ideas:”  Is Judge Posner Chasing Don Quixote’s 
Windmills?, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1144–46 (2000) (discussing the problematic nature of 
economics in speech contexts). 
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traditional cost-benefit analyses fail to capture expression’s full utility.80  It 
may, in fact, be impossible to measure the true social and economic 
consequences of repressing speech. 
The greater point is that by allowing popular opinion, rather than the 
government, to strike down repugnant ideas, the First Amendment should 
incentivize socially valuable ideas while excluding unsavory speech.81  As 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist remarked, free speech is analogous “to the 
commercial market in which a laissez-faire policy would lead to optimum 
economic decisionmaking under the guidance of the ‘invisible hand.’”82  
Notice, however, that this analysis has almost completely focused on the 
government’s restriction of speech.  The following section explores the less-
discussed role of private actors and emphasizes their incentives to abridge 
free expression and the resulting market failures. 
B.  Incentives of Private Parties to Monopolize and Restrain Trade in the 
Marketplace of Ideas 
The ability of private actors to suppress content has received less attention 
than the government’s efforts.83  While the First Amendment protects speech 
from state action, no such limitation impedes private firms and individuals:  
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”84  In fact, 
firms have incentives to exclude ideas and, when wielding sufficient market 
power, the capability to do so.  This section discusses the ways a monopolist 
can capture supracompetitive profits by excluding rival ideas and creating 
market failures identical to when the government bans speech. 
Perhaps scholars have ignored the role of private actors because the 
penchant of individuals to discriminate against viewpoints can benefit 
society, as this is the very process by which the market rejects unsavory ideas 
or accepts innovative ones.  Such freedom “nourish[es] . . . the citizenry’s 
right to choose among competing values.”85  In turn, modern theory of the 
First Amendment assumes that the government should resist enacting laws 
against, for example, fascist speech because public opinion tends to condemn 
these views anyway.  To illustrate, media coverage of the white nationalist 
rallies in Charlottesville, Virginia created such outcry that employers fired 
many of the participants.86  Private firms essentially raised the costs of 
 
 80. Rushton, supra note 70, at 719. 
 81. See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Marketplace for Ideas?, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 395, 424 (2005) (discussing the benefits conferred by the marketplace of ideas on 
economic efficacy); see also Stucke & Grunes, supra note 34, at 1400 (noting that the First 
Amendment is intended to promote a healthy marketplace of ideas by achieving “the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources”). 
 82. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 592 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 83. See generally WU, supra note 11. 
 84. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
 85. Eule & Varat, supra note 13, at 1552. 
 86. See Naomi LaChance, More Nazis Are Getting Identified and Fired After 
Charlottesville, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2017, 1:21 PM), https:// 
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espousing racist perspectives.87  Thus, given the benefits of allowing private 
parties to engage in censorship in the government’s stead, the U.S. legal 
system places few restrictions—either constitutional or statutory—on the 
right of private actors to stifle speech. 
However, when a firm accrues market power, it can erect artificial barriers 
to entry, preventing others from introducing viewpoints and products based 
on ideas.88  Market power (a term that this Article will use interchangeably 
with “monopoly power”) is defined as the ability to profitably raise a good’s 
price above a competitive level.89  There are, indeed, numerous instances of 
firms using their monopoly power to exclude types of speech.  To use a 
current example, critics allege that Google impedes information about rival 
goods.  The Wall Street Journal reported that consumers who search Google 
for commercial items are likely to receive results about goods owned by 
Google rather than competing products.90  For instance, a search of 
“thermostat” is likely to return shopping suggestions for Nest—a Google-
owned company that makes thermostats.  The search may also display Nest 
products in Google’s “Top Stories,” general results, and a section entitled 
“Best Thermostats,”91 though information about competing products is often 
buried.  And given the allegations that Google censors political and social 
expression, the implication is that Google prevents certain actors from 
disseminating information—essentially impeding their ability to speak.92 
Consider a more obscure example.  It is alleged that dominant players in 




 87. See, e.g., Charlie Warzel, Read Apple CEO Tim Cook’s Email to Employees About 
Charlottesville, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 16, 2017, 10:59 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/ 
charliewarzel/read-apple-ceo-tim-cooks-email-to-employees-about [https://perma.cc/E9PY-
VFYB] (using an example of a corporate policy meant to discourage racism). 
 88. See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 152–54 (1951) (finding 
that a local newspaper used anticompetitive methods intended to remove a radio station from 
the market to maintain its monopoly in Lorain, Ohio). 
 89. See Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 97–98 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(“Monopoly power, also referred to as market power, is ‘the power to control prices or exclude 
competition.’” (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 
351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956))). 
 90. See Michael Luca et al., Does Google Content Degrade Google Search?:  
Experimental Evidence (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16-035, 2015), 
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/23492375/16-035.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2YN-
5XBM]; Tom Fairless, Study Suggests Google Harms Consumers by Skewing Search Results, 
WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2015, 4:18 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB11064341213388534269604581077241146083956 [https://perma.cc/9WG4-BF95]. 
 91. GOOGLE, https://www.google.com [https://perma.cc/CA5G-PEXU] (last visited Feb. 
14, 2020) (type “thermostat” in the search bar and click “Google Search”). 
 92. See Jack Nicas, Google Uses Its Search Engine to Hawk Its Products, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 19, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-uses-its-search-engine-to-
hawk-its-products-1484827203 [https://perma.cc/6SSL-KC4X] (“Google searches for 
‘phones’ virtually always began with three consecutive ads for Google’s Pixel phones.  All 
1,000 searches for ‘laptops’ started with a Chromebook ad.  ‘Watches’ began with an Android 
smartwatch ad 98% of the time.  And ‘smoke detector’ led with back-to-back ads for internet-
connected alarms made by Nest, a company owned by Google parent Alphabet.”). 
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works.  A painting’s value can hinge on its inclusion in the relevant catalogue 
raisonné,93 which is an authoritative listing of works attributed to a specific 
painter.94  Because the decision to include a painting in a catalogue raisonné 
is often made by a council of experts who own paintings by that artist, these 
experts have incentives to deny authenticity.  After all, each time they verify 
a painting, it decreases the oeuvre’s value by increasing supply.95  For 
example, the Andy Warhol Foundation was accused of denying the 
authenticity of valid Warhols so that its members could inflate the values of 
their personal works—effectively depriving the market of important art.96  
Market power may thus vest actors such as authentication councils with the 
capacity and incentives to suppress forms of expression. 
Since the crux of the problem is not necessarily the desire to eliminate 
competition but rather the monopoly power to do so, some excluded 
speakers, journalists, and artists have sought to use antitrust law to promote 
their right to free expression.97  But as the next Part explains, the evolution 
of antitrust law has significantly narrowed the practices it considers illegal, 
leading the courts to determine that they possess no authority to remedy 
injuries suffered in the marketplace of ideas.  This is because antitrust law 
protects commercial markets as opposed to speech markets in which 
noncommercial goods, such as ideas, trade. 
II.  THE PREVAILING TREATMENT OF SPEECH UNDER ANTITRUST LAW 
In light of recent lawsuits characterizing suppressed speech as 
anticompetitive, this Part presents the orthodox view that antitrust law lacks 
authority to govern speech and ideas.  To reach this conclusion, the courts 
have relied on a combination of statutory interpretation, judicial precedent, 
and legislative history to find that the Sherman Act may only remedy 
economic injuries arising in commercial markets, excluding the marketplace 
 
 93. Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Found., 890 N.Y.S.2d 16, 21 (App. Div. 2009) 
(noting that the plaintiff sued after the defendant refused to include a painting in an author’s 
catalogue raisonné which essentially signaled that the work was not marketable). 
 94. See Jeffrey Orenstein, Comment, Show Me the Monet:  The Suitability of Product 
Disparagement to Art Experts, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 905, 914 (2005) (“[C]atalogue 
raisonné is an authoritative index of an artist’s work, covering either the artist’s full oeuvre or 
a specific category of his works . . . . [W]hen the authors of a catalogue raisonné omit a work, 
they cast serious doubt on its authenticity and profoundly affect the work’s marketability.”). 
 95. See Gareth S. Lacy, Student Article, Standardizing Warhol:  Antitrust Liability for 
Denying the Authenticity of Artwork, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 185, 189–90 (2011) 
(explaining that antitrust lawsuits have been brought against the boards that validate works for 
a catalogue raisonné). 
 96. Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 6423 
(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009) (“Plaintiff asserts that the Board is 
completely dominated and controlled by the Foundation, and that the Foundation uses the 
Board to remove competing Warhols from the market in an attempt to monopolize the 
market.” (citations omitted)); see also Georgina Adam, Thorny Issues, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 25, 
2011, 10:25 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/e079e514-1068-11e1-8010-00144feabdc0.html 
[https://perma.cc/4EQS-TYCT]. 
 97. See supra notes 20–29 and accompanying text (providing examples of antitrust 
litigation meant to promote free expression). 
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of ideas from antitrust’s purview.  The following analysis explores why the 
courts have found that ideas and speech are fatally noncommercial.  This 
framework is then refuted in significant part as antiquated in latter parts of 
the Article. 
A.  Modern Antitrust Law 
The courts have generally interpreted antitrust law to find that ideas and 
viewpoints trade in noncommercial markets and thus lie outside of antitrust’s 
scope.  From a textual standpoint, the Sherman Act is limited to condemning 
practices that harm “trade” or “commerce,” as section 1 of the Sherman Act 
bans “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise . . . in 
restraint of trade or commerce,”98 while section 2 makes it illegal to 
“monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or 
commerce.”99  Although the courts and Congress have yet to establish a 
universally accepted rule to determine whether an act qualifies as trade or 
commerce,100 the statutory text indicates that conduct existing outside a 
commercial market cannot incur antitrust liability.101 
In fact, over the past forty years, the courts have narrowed antitrust’s scope 
even further so that enforcement may only remedy certain types of economic 
injuries.  A practical problem inspired this development:  courts had 
historically struggled to differentiate shrewd business practices from 
anticompetitive behavior, as competition should threaten the survival of less 
efficient firms.102  To make enforcement more predictable and rigorous, 
beginning in the 1970s, scholars such as Robert Bork103 sought to limit 
antitrust’s scope to the singular purpose of fostering economic goals.104  The 
Supreme Court, in adopting this position, announced that antitrust law may 
only protect the competitive process for the economic benefit of consumers 
 
 98. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (emphasis added). 
 99. Id. § 2 (emphasis added). 
 100. See generally IB PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 262 (3d ed. 2006) (proposing 
a method to determine commercial conduct in light of the lack of an accepted test). 
 101. Johnson v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 202 F. Supp. 3d 159, 170–71 (D.D.C. 
2016) (stating that an entity must exist in a commercial market to implicate antitrust law), 
aff’d, 869 F.3d 976 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 102. Prior to the mid-1970s, enforcement was used to condemn firms that created superior 
products, generating distinctively anticompetitive results. Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason 
and the Per Se Concept:  Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 815 (1965) 
(explaining that, at one time, antitrust law was unwisely used to protect smaller, oftentimes 
less efficient firms from their more efficient competitors.). 
 103. Probably the most important contributor to antitrust’s reform was Robert Bork. See 
generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:  A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); 
Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966); 
see also Daniel A. Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust:  Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust 
Policy, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 840 (2014). 
 104. Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust:  Welfare Trumps 
Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2405–06 (2013) (explaining that antitrust law has evolved 
so that, over the past forty years, it has adopted an exclusively economic perspective). 
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rather than individual competitors.105  To meet this standard, today, one must 
generally demonstrate that the defendant abused its market power106 by 
raising prices, restricting output,107 or similarly harming consumers 
economically.108  Measuring consumer welfare in economic terms is thus 
intended to help target and condemn anticompetitive behavior as opposed to 
vigorous competition.109 
B.  Antitrust’s Hostility to the Marketplace of Ideas 
In light of this reform, Justice Holmes’s metaphor of a marketplace of 
ideas might not qualify as the type of market required by antitrust law.110  
Consider Johnson v. Commission on Presidential Debates.111  Former 
presidential candidate Gary Johnson claimed that the Commission on 
Presidential Debates offended the Sherman Act by excluding third-party 
speech from the marketplace of political discourse.112  It is likely that 
Johnson suffered harm as he had little chance of winning the 2016 election 
without participating in the debates.113  The court rejected Johnson’s lawsuit, 
however, because his alleged anticompetitive effect—the restriction of 
political ideas—was insufficient.  To the court, discourse “refer[s] to ideas, 
not products or services that are traded in a commercial marketplace, and 
thus this claim does not allege a cognizable antitrust injury.”114  Further, 
“calling political activity a ‘market place’ does not make it so. . . .  As with 
 
 105. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 333 (1990) (remarking that 
antitrust laws are meant to prevent harm to markets and competition but not individual 
competitors); Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (replacing the 
per se rule proscribing vertical restraints of trade with a balancing test to determine whether 
or not the restraint promotes competition). 
 106. Market power is an element of a section 1 claim, though it is also typically required 
in a section 2 lawsuit as an indirect way of proving the anticompetitive effects of a trade 
restraint.  This is because, in the absence of market power, exclusionary conduct is seldom 
able to injure competition. Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., Inc., 354 F.3d 
661, 663 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The first requirement in every suit based on the Rule of Reason is 
market power, without which the practice cannot cause those injuries (lower output and the 
associated welfare losses) that matter under the federal antitrust laws.”); see also Louis 
Kaplow, On the Relevance of Market Power, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1304–05 (2017) 
(“Market power is regarded to be the most important determinant of liability in competition 
law . . . .  The importance of market power inquiries is widely endorsed by lawyers and 
economists alike.”). 
 107. Ginzburg v. Mem’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 998, 1026 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
 108. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 104, at 2406 (“It is difficult to overstate the importance 
of GTE Sylvania as the foundation of the economic approach to antitrust analysis:  antitrust 
would no longer serve multiple masters; economic goals would be exclusive.”). 
 109. Energy Conversion Devices Liquidation Tr. v. Trina Solar Ltd., 833 F.3d 680, 685 
(6th Cir. 2016) (“At their core, the antitrust laws are a ‘consumer welfare prescription’ . . . .” 
(quoting BORK, supra note 103, at 66)). 
 110. DataCell ehf. v. Visa, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-1658 GBL/TCB, 2015 WL 4624714, at *7 
(E.D. Va. July 30, 2015) (ruling that “the marketplace for ideas” is not an economic market 
under antitrust law). 
 111. 869 F.3d 976 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 112. Id. at 983. 
 113. Id. (ruling that Johnson had failed to establish an antitrust injury). 
 114. Johnson v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 202 F. Supp. 3d 159, 171 (D.D.C. 2016), 
aff’d, 869 F.3d 976 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
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holding political office, running for political office is not ‘commerce’ under 
antitrust law.”115 
In a similar case, WikiLeaks achieved infamy in 2007 when it released 
volumes of documents classified by the U.S. government.116  Due to this, 
several credit card companies halted payments to and through DataCell—the 
firm hired to operate WikiLeaks’s credit card systems—as punishment.117  
DataCell alleged in response that Visa and MasterCard had inflicted an 
anticompetitive harm on the market in the form of “suppressing the market 
place [sic] of ideas.”118  The court dismissed DataCell’s claim because, even 
if DataCell could trace its injury to the defendants, DataCell had failed to 
allege an injury to a commercial marketplace.119  Paramount to the court’s 
ruling, antitrust law is intended to promote the economic interests of 
consumers.  Yet the marketplace of ideas is distinguishable from a 
commercial market.120  As such, the court ruled that, 
[i]f the products in DataCell’s market are ideas, then the antitrust laws 
cannot help DataCell.  Congress created antitrust laws to protect free 
market competition, not to protect the free exchange of ideas.  If the 
products in DataCell’s market are classified State Department documents, 
then the antitrust laws are an even poorer fit.  In either case, DataCell cannot 
fit its grievances into the framework of [the] Sherman Act.121 
So why have courts determined that speech and ideas are noncommercial?  
Notably, academics have criticized the dichotomy of economic and 
noneconomic behavior as unworkable.122  Although few, if any, courts have 
offered a detailed analysis explaining why the marketplace of ideas is per se 
beyond antitrust’s reach, there are clues.  In essence, ideas 1) trade freely 
without prices or scarcity, 2) might not create the type of injury deserving of 
antitrust liability, and 3) cannot be monopolized or restrained. 
1.  Ideas Lack Prices 
To courts and commentators, the nature of commerce requires a 
transaction whereby each party gives valuable consideration to the other,123 
 
 115. Id. at 170. 
 116. Chris Strohm & Del Quentin Wilber, Pentagon Says Snowden Took Most U.S. Secrets 
Ever:  Rogers, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 9, 2014, 7:54 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2014-01-09/pentagon-finds-snowden-took-1-7-million-files-rogers-says.html 
[https://perma.cc/UJU5-EV82]. 
 117. DataCell ehf. v. Visa, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-1658 GBL/TCB, 2015 WL 4624714, at *1 
(E.D. Va. July 30, 2015) (noting that elected officials sought to have Sunshine Press declared 
a terrorist organization). 
 118. Id. at *6. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at *7. 
 121. Id. 
 122. John M. Newman, Procompetitive Justifications in Antitrust Law, 94 IND. L.J. 501, 
526–29 (2019). 
 123. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 340 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he modern definition of 
commerce includes ‘almost every activity from which [an] actor anticipates economic gain.’” 
(quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 100, ¶ 1260b)); John M. Newman, Antitrust in 
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as the “quintessential” commercial transaction is the exchange of money for 
goods or services.124  A market may thus lie beyond antitrust’s reach if the 
relevant goods lack prices.125  The leading scholar on nonprice goods found 
“multiple examples of courts creating de jure antitrust immunity by declining 
to apply antitrust scrutiny in zero-price contexts . . . .  These courts have done 
so on the grounds that the antitrust laws cannot apply in the absence of 
prices.”126  For example, since social media accounts are typically offered 
for free, a restraint of trade in such a market might be incapable of violating 
antitrust law.127 
This suggests—and the case law supports—that antitrust law cannot 
promote speech.128  Contrary to tangible goods traded in conventional 
markets, ideas tend to have marginal costs of zero, meaning that an idea can 
be replicated and traded without a cost or price.129  In fact, because economic 
theory predicts that a good’s value increases in concert with its scarcity—
whereas plentiful goods have little or no value—an idea bearing no marginal 
cost might lack economic worth.130  And since information “wants to, or even 
needs to, be free,”131 it could be that ideas and viewpoints are inherently 
noncommercial and thus excluded from antitrust’s scope.132  Recall the failed 
 
Zero-Price Markets:  Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 160 (2015) (“This 
understanding—that antitrust laws apply to transactions from which actors anticipate 
economic gain—accords with the intent of Congress as elucidated by the Supreme Court.  
Such transactions necessarily involve an exchange, the foundation of economic ‘gains from 
trade.’ . . .  This behavior is what is contemplated when antitrust courts, enforcement agencies, 
and commentators refer to ‘markets,’ or in the statutory parlance, ‘trade’ and ‘commerce.’”). 
 124. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 666 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The exchange of 
money for services, even by a nonprofit organization, is a quintessential commercial 
transaction.”). 
 125. Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 209 (2d Cir. 2001) (demonstrating that antitrust 
liability could not be established since the market in question was a free one). 
 126. Newman, supra note 123, at 160; see, e.g., Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 
C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (“KinderStart cites no 
authority indicating that antitrust law concerns itself with competition in the provision of free 
services.”). 
 127. Catherine Tucker & Alexander Marthews, Social Networks, Advertising, and 
Antitrust, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1211, 1211 (2012) (asserting that social networking might 
not violate antitrust law because such services are typically free); see also Kinderstart.com, 
2007 WL 831806, at *5. 
 128. See supra notes 111–22 and accompanying text (reviewing cases where courts found 
that speech cannot support an antitrust claim). 
 129. See Oskar Liivak, A Crisis of Faith & the Scientific Future of Patent Theory, 90 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 639, 651–52 (2016) (“In the conventional reward framing, the ‘natural’ 
baseline for ideas has them freely shared with prices set to marginal cost—therefore close to 
zero.”). 
 130. Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 461 (2015) 
(“Economics is based on scarcity.  Things are valuable because they are scarce.  The more 
abundant they become, the cheaper they become.”). 
 131. Osenga, supra note 43, at 2100. 
 132. See Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price:  Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual 
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 981 (2012) (“Information is understood, in 
economic terms, as a nonrival good because one person’s consumption of it does not limit 
another person’s consumption.  As a result, information only needs to be produced once for 
many people to enjoy it; in other words, its marginal cost of production is zero.”). 
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lawsuit brought by Gab about the exclusion of political speech from the 
Android app market.133  Because Gab offered a free venue to discuss politics, 
it faced the high hurdle of proving that Google violated antitrust law in a 
priceless market.134  Even bypassing this issue, a court might find that 
suppressed speech is improper for antitrust’s remedies, which the next 
section explains. 
2.  Excluding Ideas Might Not Affect Prices or Output, or Otherwise Harm 
Consumer Welfare 
A further problem is that excluding an idea, expression, or viewpoint is 
unlikely to generate the type of harm remedied by antitrust law.  As just 
discussed, the typical analysis conditions antitrust liability on evidence that 
the exclusionary act generated an anticompetitive effect, generally in the 
form of increased prices or restricted output.135  Under any theory of 
consumer welfare,136 the anticompetitive effect must harm the market from 
the economic perspective of consumers.137  So without evidence of elevated 
prices (as restricted output should naturally result in higher prices),138 an 
antitrust lawsuit alleging suppressed ideas, information, or viewpoints would 
likely struggle to demonstrate a cognizable anticompetitive effect.139  After 
all, since firms can copy and distribute ideas at minimal costs, the restriction 
of an idea’s output is unlikely to raise prices.140  And no court has ever ruled 
that the mere restriction of ideas entails the type of anticompetitive effect 
which the antitrust laws may scrutinize or remedy. 
 
 133. See generally Complaint, supra note 24. 
 134. See id. 
 135. JamSports & Entm’t, LLC v. Paradama Prods., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 824, 834 (N.D. 
Ill. 2004) (“[S]tatements that antitrust injury is limited to decreased output and increased 
prices finds support in the Supreme Court’s understanding of why Congress created a private 
right of action in antitrust cases.”); Wagner v. Magellan Health Servs., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 
673, 681 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“The antitrust injury doctrine requires that every antitrust plaintiff 
show that his loss results from actions that reduce output or raise prices to consumers.”). 
 136. There is a longstanding debate about whether antitrust should follow a “consumer 
welfare” or “total welfare” standard to which this Article does not contribute an opinion. See 
Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 573 (2012). 
 137. Razorback Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Weaver, 761 F.2d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 1985) 
(“[A]ntitrust laws exist for ‘the protection of competition, not competitors.’” (quoting 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo-Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977))). 
 138. William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 
652, 653 (1983) (“The standard economic rationale for making a cartel illegal is not that it 
charges too high a price or that it redistributes income from consumers to cartel members, but 
that it restricts output, causing a deadweight or efficiency loss . . .—a loss to consumers 
without an offsetting gain to producers.”). 
 139. Although it is less common to see a court impose antitrust liability without artificially 
high prices, courts have cited the promotion of quality, innovation, or even consumer choice 
as legitimate goals of antitrust law. See, e.g., HM Compounding Servs., Inc. v. Express Scripts, 
Inc., No. 4:14–CV–1858 JAR, 2015 WL 4162762, at *9 (E.D. Miss. July 9, 2015) (treating 
reduced consumer choice or variety as an anticompetitive effect under antitrust law); Free 
FreeHand Corp. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (declaring 
diminished innovation to entail an antitrust injury). 
 140. See Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property:  Human Capital Law and the Reach of 
Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 794 (2015). 
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For example, KinderStart alleged that Google violated antitrust law by 
suppressing information on its search engine.141  The district court dismissed 
KinderStart’s complaint because consumers do not pay a price to use 
Google—much less supracompetitive prices—which belies antitrust 
claim.142  Likewise, if an internet platform refuses to host a blog espousing 
certain viewpoints, the prohibition cannot be expected to elevate market 
prices or decrease output.  The blog could simply move to another platform.  
Even though the exclusion might cause economic harm to that blog, 
consumers are unlikely to pay inflated prices for the relevant content, 
negating the blog’s antitrust claim.143 
3.  Can Firms Even Monopolize Ideas? 
The next hurdle concerns whether a monopolist can effectively exclude 
competition.  To allege a plausible section 1 or 2 violation of the Sherman 
Act, the challenged act must have seriously threatened or harmed the 
market.144  However, since ideas are easy to reproduce and almost impossible 
to exclude—as technology has made information “transmit[table] to others 
with no loss of quality and at virtually no cost”145—a lawsuit brought under 
section 1 or 2 might struggle to prove that the marketplace of ideas was 
actually monopolized or harmed.146  For example, in a case from 1975, the 
plaintiff alleged that certain actors attempted to monopolize the “free trade 
of ideas.”147  In rejecting this claim, the court “doubt[ed], in a world which 
 
 141. Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806, at 
*5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007). 
 142. Id. (“It does not claim that Google sells its search services, or that any other search 
provider does so. . . .  KinderStart cites no authority indicating that antitrust law concerns itself 
with competition in the provision of free services.  Providing search functionality may lead to 
revenue from other sources, but KinderStart has not alleged that anyone pays Google to search.  
Thus, the Search Market is not a ‘market’ for purposes of antitrust law.”); cf. VBR Tours, LLC 
v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 14-cv-00804, 2015 WL 5693735, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 
28, 2015) (holding that antitrust is only concerned with prices and output rather than incentives 
to innovate and commercialize ideas). 
 143. See Howard Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the 
Internet, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1669–70 (2013) (“Conventional antitrust analysis focuses 
on the relationship between firms’ conduct and market performance, as measured through 
prices and output levels of relevant products and services.”). 
 144. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Under a Rule of Reason 
analysis, the plaintiff carries the burden of showing that an agreement or contract has an 
anticompetitive effect on a given market within a given geographic area.”); Nifty Foods Corp. 
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The essential elements of an 
attempted monopolization claim are (1) a dangerous possibility of success in monopolizing a 
given market; and (2) a specific intent to destroy competition or build monopoly.”); Cohen v. 
Primerica Corp., 709 F. Supp. 63, 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 145. Lemley, supra note 130, at 470 (explaining how ideas are not rivalrous and thus public 
goods). 
 146. See Ejan Mackaay, Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and Innovation, 
13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 867, 904–05 (1990) (discussing the ease by which information 
can be freely and easily replicated). 
 147. Adams v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 400 F. Supp. 219, 221–22 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
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has not yet reached the ominous year of 1984, whether monopolization of 
ideas is even possible.”148 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the struggles of establishing an 
antitrust claim premised on diminished speech.  As explained, courts have 
ruled that ideas do not trade in commercial markets and seldom create the 
type of injury required by antitrust law.  Whether one can even monopolize 
the marketplace of ideas is a valid question.  So, despite the benefits of 
promoting free speech, the odds of success under the antitrust laws are 
perilously low.  Notwithstanding this framework, the next Part discusses the 
emergence of political rhetoric asserting that antitrust should condemn tech 
giants and other monopolists who impede speech. 
III.  THE RAPIDLY EVOLVING MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS WITHIN 
ANTITRUST’S LANDSCAPE 
Antitrust’s approach to speech is at a crossroads due to fundamental shifts 
in the economic and political landscape.  Lawmakers from both sides of the 
aisle, multiple branches of the federal government, and state governments 
have recently sought to characterize acts of censorship as products of 
anticompetitive behavior.  Inspiring this movement is the belief that big 
tech’s monopoly power threatens free expression.  However, these proposals 
require a reinterpretation of antitrust law given the obstacles discussed in Part 
II.  And proscribing certain acts of censorship might harm free speech more 
than benefit it.  Indeed, since the First Amendment protects the right to reject 
repugnant ideas, the courts would likely struggle to discern whether an 
instance of censorship entails protected speech or constitutes a matter for 
antitrust enforcement.  Based on this conundrum, and despite political 
rhetoric calling for the integration of speech into enforcement, a belief is 
emerging that “we’re at one of those antitrust moments” whereby the courts 
or Congress might need to overhaul the antitrust laws.149 
This Part explores how antitrust’s relationship with information has 
emerged as a hotly contested issue.  Since the economic emergence of ideas, 
speech, and information might enable firms to suppress speech, Part III.A 
explores whether antitrust’s framework may need to evolve.  Part III.B traces 
the manner in which big tech has inspired a diverse group of lawmakers to 
propose ways of promoting free speech as a function of antitrust 
enforcement.  Part III.C presents the conundrum:  in light of mounting 
sentiments to incorporate speech into antitrust’s framework, the ensuing 
proposals would likely harm free speech more than foster it. 
A.  Ideas Should Entail Economic Activity 
Recent debate about whether antitrust should scrutinize big tech’s 
influence on free speech is rooted in fundamental changes to the economy.  
 
 148. Id. at 223. 
 149. Streitfeld, supra note 33. 
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Recognizing that enforcement must further economic goals,150 courts have 
perhaps relied on antiquated measures of economic activity to hold that 
speech is beyond antitrust’s scope.  The principal goods exchanged in today’s 
markets are not manufactured goods sold at retail prices but rather “free” 
intangible goods, which scholars describe as items receiving their character 
and value from an underlying idea.151  As this section explains, the 
economy’s evolution has increased the power that certain companies wield 
over speech, suggesting that antitrust law might need to modernize for big 
tech’s arrival.152 
Before weighing the implications for speech, consider the profitability of 
the platform industry whereby firms offer free venues to express views and 
sell products.153  In addition to Facebook, whose annual revenue has eclipsed 
fifty-five billion dollars, the market capitalization of the top six platforms has 
surpassed one trillion dollars.154  Animated by a cottage industry of 
Instagram influencers and public figures, users have likewise capitalized on 
this technology.155  Other examples of this business model include 
commercial blogs156 and news outlets, such as the Huffington Post, which 
 
 150. Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 133, 133–34 (2010) (“[T]he stated instrumental goal of antitrust laws is ‘consumer 
welfare,’ which is a defined term in economics.”). 
 151. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Information Products:  A Challenge to Intellectual 
Property Theory, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 897, 897 (1988) (“I define information products 
to mean items like computer technology (including software programs and computerized data 
bases), ‘designer genes’ and semiconductors:  products whose information content vastly 
exceeds in value the cost of the products on which that information is stored.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 152. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT:  
BREAKTHROUGH INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 8–10 (2015), https://www.wipo.int/ 
edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_944_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3EN-9VAM] (detailing the 
litany of positive externalities and economic growth derived from innovation); Robert W. 
Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law Jurisprudence:  Its Nature and 
Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 204 (2009) (“The economy has undergone a profound 
transformation in the past few decades, away from emphasizing the production of hard goods 
and toward the creation of ideas and information.”); Innovation Union, EUR. COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/index_en.cfm [https://perma.cc/Y6WP-
9WWB] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020). 
 153. Martina Frascona Sochurkova, Facebook’s Revenues in 2017 Exceeded $40 Billion, 
NEWSFEED.ORG (Aug. 3, 2018), https://newsfeed.org/facebooks-revenues-in-2017-exceeded-
40-billion [https://perma.cc/74T4-VXPY]. 
 154. Facebook’s Annual Revenue and Net Income from 2007 to 2018, STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/277229/facebooks-annual-revenue-and-net-income/ 
[https://perma.cc/VR5V-YK53] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020); Justin Kerby, Here’s How Much 
Facebook, Snapchat, and Other Major Social Networks Are Worth, SOC. MEDIA TODAY (May 
16, 2017), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/social-networks/heres-how-much-facebook-
snapchat-and-other-major-social-networks-are-worth [https://perma.cc/D44S-BKHH]. 
 155. See, e.g., Caroline Moss, The Huge but Hidden World of High School ‘Cheerlebrities’ 
Who Have Hundreds of Thousands of Fans on Instagram, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 25, 2014, 8:23 
AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/cheerlebrities-of-instagram-carley-manning-2014-1 
[https://perma.cc/L2SZ-D929]. 
 156. David Segal, Arianna Huffington’s Improbable Insatiable Content Machine, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (June 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/05/magazine/arianna-
huffingtons-improbable-insatiable-content-machine.html [https://perma.cc/9CJT-KULY]. 
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earned $146 million in revenue in 2014 by virtue of supplying zero-priced 
content.157 
Given the monopoly power in this industry, observers have grown anxious 
that platforms can and do censor speech.  Recall the allegations that Google 
manipulates commercial, social, and political forms of expression.158  
Facebook has similarly grappled with issues of censorship, and the company 
recently circulated an internal memo asking, “What should be the limits to 
what people can express?”159  Facebook drew bipartisan scorn when it 
banned a video by Senator Warren calling for the company’s breakup.160  
Criticisms of this vintage are especially fierce where few would consider the 
deleted content to be dangerous or repugnant, such as Instagram’s censorship 
of breastfeeding161 or photos of plus-size bodies.162  Similar controversies 
include Amazon’s and Facebook’s decisions to restrict or allow anti-
vaccination speech.163 
As in the platform industry, firms in the tech and communications sectors 
are generating previously unimaginable revenue—Apple’s market 
capitalization exceeds one trillion dollars—while wielding more power over 
free expression than potentially the government.164  According to Dan Burk, 
the manner in which private companies control the channels of information 
enables them to manipulate and suppress information.165  Tim Wu remarked 
in The Master Switch that “[w]e sometimes treat the information industries 
as if they were like any other enterprise, but they are not, for their structure 
determines who gets heard.”166  The pervasiveness of this fear had led, in 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text (describing the concern that large 
corporations are using their market power to suppress speech). 
 159. Carlos E. Castaneda, Mothers to Protest Instagram, Facebook Censorship of 
Breastfeeding Images, CBS SF BAY AREA (July 11, 2014, 3:17 PM), 
https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/07/11/mothers-to-protest-instagram-facebook-
censorship-of-breastfeeding-images/ [https://perma.cc/HDK3-2EH6]; Conor Friedersdorf, 
The Speech That Facebook Plans to Punish, ATLANTIC (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/facebook-punish-censorship/577654/ 
[https://perma.cc/5C8R-4BK3]. 
 160. Cristiano Lima, Facebook Backtracks After Removing Warren Ads Calling for 
Facebook Breakup, POLITICO (Mar. 11, 2019, 6:32 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/ 
2019/03/11/facebook-removes-elizabeth-warren-ads-1216757 [https://perma.cc/CRE3-
FUED]. 
 161. Mikelle Street, Tom Biachi’s Instagram Ban Is the Latest in Queer Social Media 
Censorship, OUT (Feb. 5, 2019, 10:40 AM), https://www.out.com/photography/2019/2/05/ 
tom-bianchis-instagram-ban-latest-queer-censorship [https://perma.cc/528W-5ZSU]. 
 162. Lora Grady, Why Women Are Calling Out Instagram for Censoring Photos of Plus-
Size Bodies, CHATELAINE (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.chatelaine.com/opinion/instagram-
censorship-plus-size/ [https://perma.cc/8DJQ-X26G]. 
 163. Cheryl K. Chumley, Facebook Censorship of Anti-Vaccination Movement Will 
Backfire, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/ 
feb/15/facebook-turns-censorship-eyes-toward-anti-vaccina/ [https://perma.cc/6J9D-2HB8]. 
 164. Sara Salinas, Apple Hangs onto Its Historical $1 Trillion Market Cap, CNBC (Aug. 
2, 2018, 11:48 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/02/apple-hits-1-trillion-in-market-
value.html [https://perma.cc/9UWU-A2A9]. 
 165. Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 100 (2000). 
 166. WU, supra note 11, at 13. 
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fact, to the now defunct net neutrality,167 which sought to prevent firms from 
discriminating against, or excluding, ideas and viewpoints from internet 
discourse.168 
Just as important to the economy as the communications sector, innovation 
is said to rely on free speech.169  The Supreme Court suggested that aspects 
of scientific information—such as the “sale, disclosure, and use” of ideas—
might implicate the First Amendment.170  Literature on this subject, albeit 
sparse, has traced a convincing argument that innovation as well as research 
and development (R&D) should entail speech.171  R&D requires inventors to 
express original ideas in the creation of commodities that display each 
inventor’s artistic or expressive choices.172  And since innovation is “the 
single, most important component of long-term economic growth,”173 it 
follows that innovation may constitute a form of commercial expression.  But 
setting aside the question of whether innovation qualifies as speech, a 
credible argument can be made that antitrust should incorporate the 
marketplace of ideas into enforcement in order to foster innovation and thus 
economic growth. 
The above examples illustrate the emerging value of ideas, speech, and 
information—even when lacking prices, scarcity, or marginal costs.  Because 
this development might empower firms to suppress speech, the question of 
whether antitrust law should scrutinize big tech’s influence on expression has 
emerged as a hot-button political issue, detailed in the next section. 
 
 167. Net Neutrality:  President Obama’s Plan for a Free and Open Internet, WHITE HOUSE, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/net-neutrality [https://perma.cc/JR6E-EJH3] (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2020) (providing the rules and background content of net neutrality during the 
Obama administration). 
 168. Corynne McSherry, An Attack on Net Neutrality Is an Attack on Free Speech, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 22, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/06/ 
attack-net-neutrality-attack-free-speech [https://perma.cc/7EVW-HHDS] (“In 2014, that 
powerful idea motivated millions of Internet users to band together and demand that the FCC 
enact clear, legally sound rules to prevent broadband providers from taking advantage of their 
power as gatekeepers to engage in unfair practices like paid prioritization, blocking, and other 
forms of data discrimination.”); Rob Pegoraro, How to Tell If Net Neutrality Repeal Is Why 
Your Internet Is Slower, USA TODAY (Dec. 14, 2017, 10:17 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/tech/columnist/2017/11/28/after-net-neutrality-how-tell-if-your-isp-slowing-your-
internet/898098001 [https://perma.cc/6KV7-V7RR]. 
 169. See Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 81, at 424 (explaining that ideas are key to 
innovation); Mackaay, supra note 146, at 871 (“Innovation involves gambling, betting on 
ideas.”). 
 170. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011); Hillary Greene, Muzzling 
Antitrust:  Information Products, Innovation and Free Speech, 95 B.U. L. REV. 35, 68 (2015) 
(“In the absence of controlling or sufficiently instructive precedent regarding First 
Amendment defenses to antitrust matters involving information providers, widely divergent 
positions emerged.”). 
 171. Burk, supra note 165, at 112–13 (“[M]y automobile, my running shoes, my table 
cutlery, and essentially every other object that surrounds me in an industrialized society is the 
embodiment of some artisan's or engineer's design. . . .  The designers think carefully about 
what they are composing.  That careful thought, some of which may include very innovative 
ideas, is translated into embodiments of steel, cloth, or latex.”). 
 172. Id. at 100. 
 173. NATHAN ROSENBERG, OECD, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (2004), 
https://www.oecd.org/cfe/tourism/34267902.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CBC-A6JR]. 
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B.  Free Speech, Tech, and the Modern Political Climate 
The initial rumblings that big tech threatened speech were sparked by 
reports of platforms censoring news stories and political expression.174  To 
many politicians and lawmakers, the fear is that content producers require 
the major online forums to reach the masses, and denials of these forums 
could stifle speech.  As one commentator argued, “The problem here is that 
certain platforms have monopolized the market for audiences.”175  
Compounding this issue, most platforms conceal their algorithms targeting 
types of speech, which creates a black box of censorship.176 
Notice that two kinds of censorship are alleged:  political and commercial.  
With respect to the former, critics contend that tech monopolists harbor an 
agenda which motivates them to censor certain ideological speech.  Notably, 
both sides of the aisle have made this claim.177  The other assertion is that 
firms, as economic actors, abridge commercial speech to achieve economic 
objectives.  To illustrate, Amazon and Google allegedly reorder search 
results or bury entries to favor their own products.178  The implication is that 
the suppression of commercial information creates an anticompetitive injury 
suffered by consumers.  To critics of Amazon, for example, the strategies of 
“[l]imiting access by denying space on a platform or pushing down listings 
in search results are anticompetitive acts.”179 
Given the notion that speech is at risk, politicians have recently proposed 
both vague and detailed plans to promote free expression under the antitrust 
laws.180  Senator Warren, lamenting big tech’s ability to censor speech, 
 
 174. Mark Epstein, Google’s Effort to Undermine Free Speech Strengthens Case for 
Regulating Big Tech, HILL (Aug. 31, 2017, 3:21 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-
blog/technology/348742-googles-effort-to-undermine-free-speech-strengthens-case-for 
[https://perma.cc/D83W-WJRM]. 
 175. Paul Blumenthal, The Problem Isn’t Alex Jones’ Free Speech, It’s Digital Platform 
Monopolies, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 11, 2018, 8:01 AM), https:// 
www.huffpost.com/entry/alex-jones-first-amendment_n_5b6d9b57e4b0530743c95939 
[https://perma.cc/B7TX-39V2]. 
 176. Julia Angwin & Hannes Grassegger, Facebook’s Secret Censorship Rules Protect 
White Men from Hate Speech but Not Black Children, PROPUBLICA (June 28, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-hate-speech-censorship-internal-documents-
algorithms [https://perma.cc/PEP2-6RCZ]. 
 177. See, e.g., Harmeet Dhillon & Matthew Peterson, Banding Together Against Big Tech, 
REAL CLEAR POL. (May 31, 2019), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/05/31/ 
banding_together_against_big_tech_140453.html [https://perma.cc/V922-4HVJ]; see also 
Angwin & Grassegger, supra note 176. 
 178. Hicks, supra note 49; Eugene Kim, Amazon Has Been Promoting Its Own Products 
at the Bottom of Competitors’ Listings, CNBC (Mar. 18, 2019, 3:48 PM), https:// 
www.cnbc.com/2018/10/02/amazon-is-testing-a-new-feature-that-promotes-its-private-label-
brands-inside-a-competitors-product-listing.html [https://perma.cc/LZN2-5VV9]. 
 179. George Anderson, Amazon Was Wise to Head Antitrust Regulators Off at the Pass, 
FORBES (Mar. 21, 2019, 11:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/retailwire/2019/03/ 
21/amazon-was-wise-to-head-antitrust-regulators-off-at-the-pass/ [https://perma.cc/ELR2-
RUH9]. 
 180. Blumenthal, supra note 175 (“There is a way to deal with this problem that doesn’t 
make it impossible for platforms to moderate content users post to them.  It’s called antitrust 
law.  If there weren’t one main platform for video distribution and one main platform for social 
media—and if those platforms didn’t also own their biggest competition—an actual market 
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tweeted, “I want a social media marketplace that isn’t dominated by a single 
censor.  #BreakUpBigTech.”181  She also proposed a two-prong approach:  
1) unwind anticompetitive mergers of tech giants (e.g., Facebook and 
Instagram) and 2) label big tech as “platform utilities.”182  The DOJ’s 
antitrust chief, Makan Delrahim, stated in a speech about “digital 
gatekeepers” that free speech is a reflection of market quality that antitrust 
should potentially promote.183  According to Senator Cruz, 
Facebook and Google are both larger than Standard Oil when it was broken 
up . . . .  [T]here’s a reason we have the antitrust laws which is to prevent 
monopolies from abusing their power and abusing consumers.  If they’re 
behaving like Big Brother and censoring political speech, I think that raises 
very serious legal questions.184 
Although President Donald Trump has expressed support for using antitrust 
law to foster free speech—his 2016 campaign asserted that big tech is 
“destroying an American democracy that depends on a free flow of 
information and freedom of thought”—his agencies have yet to enforce this 
position.185 
As for other regulatory attempts to cabin big tech, Senator Josh Hawley 
introduced the Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, which would 
require platforms hosting over thirty million users to obtain certification from 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that the platform “does not moderate 
information provided by other information content providers in a manner that 
is biased against a political party, political candidate, or political 
viewpoint.”186  A bill was also proposed in Texas that would prohibit forms 
of online censorship—but as critics note, aspects of the proposed legislation 
seem to violate the U.S. Constitution.187 
 
for different platforms that hosted varied content could exist instead of one platform overrun 
with every type of jerk.”). 
 181. Elizabeth Warren (@ewarren), TWITTER (Mar. 11, 2019, 4:59 PM), https:// 
twitter.com/ewarren/status/1105256905058979841 [https://perma.cc/EVW2-X6TK]. 
 182. Michael Hiltzik, Column:  Sen. Warren’s Plan to Break Up the Big Tech Companies 
Is Good, but Too Narrow, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/ 
business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-warren-tech-breakup-20190321-story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
252M-M3PT]. 
 183. Delrahim, Digital Gatekeepers, supra note 32. 
 184. Press Release, Ted Cruz, U.S. Senator, Sen. Cruz:  We Have an Obligation to Defend 
the First Amendment Right of Every American on Social Media Platforms (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=3723 [https://perma.cc/7UKY-NB7W]. 
 185. Epstein, supra note 33 (quoting Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign). 
 186. Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019); David 
French, Josh Hawley’s Internet Censorship Bill Is an Unwise, Unconstitutional Mess, NAT’L 
REV. (June 20, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/06/josh-hawley-
internet-censorship-bill-unconstitutional/ [https://perma.cc/5EA6-UQCD]; Corinne Weaver, 
Hawley Introduces Bill to Make Big Tech Embrace Free Speech, MRC NEWSBUSTERS (June 
19, 2019, 10:49 AM), https://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/2019/06/19/hawley-introduces-
bill-make-big-tech-embrace-free-speech [https://perma.cc/9GA5-94ET]. 
 187. Elizabeth Byrne, Texas Bill Would Allow State to Sue Social Media Companies Like 
Facebook and Twitter over Free Speech, TEX. TRIB. (Apr. 23, 2019, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2019/04/23/texas-senate-bill-lets-state-sue-social-media-
companies/ [https://perma.cc/46BX-R5KG]. 
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European authorities have, in fact, already levied antitrust penalties on tech 
monopolies for inhibiting the flow of information.  In 2017, antitrust 
enforcers in Europe fined Google €2.4 billion for “‘abus[ing] its dominant 
position by systematically favoring’ its own shopping comparison 
service[s].”188  The complaint’s gist was that Google harms competition and 
consumers in excluding competitors’ speech.189  European authorities then 
imposed a €1.5 billion penalty on Google for coercing firms into using 
AdSense, its subsidiary, rather than competing advertisers—again, asserting 
that Google manipulates how and whether firms can express commercial 
speech.190  This momentum has since led European enforcers to initiate 
similar investigations into Apple’s practices.191 
In the United States, the above rhetoric creates an obvious tension:  the 
will of American politicians to foster speech under the antitrust laws 
contradicts precedent whereby U.S. courts have held that antitrust lacks 
authority to promote free expression.  And even if the courts reconsider this 
framework, the incorporation of speech into antitrust’s purview might 
impede free speech more than foster it.  The following section explains why, 
in light of the sentiments detailed above, the goal of promoting speech should 
perhaps remain beyond antitrust’s reach. 
C.  Antitrust’s Speech Conundrum 
An important issue must be discussed:  the imposition of antitrust liability 
on those who suppress speech could actually offend the First Amendment.  
For speech to thrive, private actors must enjoy the right to exclude bad ideas 
while advancing goods ones.192  By guaranteeing this freedom, antitrust 
proposals to govern private speech would likely undermine free expression, 
as it would pit actors who both operate under the First Amendment against 
each other. 
Most laymen conceive of free speech as a positive action—i.e., the 
physical expression of an idea or viewpoint—but another component of the 
First Amendment is the right to exclude.  Since forced inclusion of content 
 
 188. James Vincent, Google Fined a Record €2.4 Billion by the EU for Manipulating 
Search Results, VERGE (June 27, 2017, 5:48 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/6/27/ 
15872354/google-eu-fine-antitrust-shopping [https://perma.cc/7TSF-N4HQ]. 
 189. Rich McCormick & James Vincent, EU Formally Accuses Google of Monopolistic 
Search Practices, VERGE (Apr. 15, 2015, 6:06 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/4/15/ 
8418577/google-antitrust-eu-monopolistic-search-fines [https://perma.cc/U36H-8KSJ]. 
 190. James Vincent, Google Hit with €1.5 Billion Antitrust Fine by EU, VERGE (Mar. 20, 
2019, 7:11 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/20/18270891/google-eu-antitrust-fine-
adsense-advertising [https://perma.cc/RHC4-Q4HG]. 
 191. Ryan Browne, Apple Is Reportedly Set to Face an EU Investigation over Spotify’s 
Competition Complaint, CNBC (May 6, 2019, 4:35 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/06/ 
apple-set-to-face-eu-antitrust-probe-over-spotify-complaint-ft-report.html 
[https://perma.cc/7TVB-7DFN]; Chris Welch, Apple’s Latest Defense of the App Store Just 
Shows How Hard It Is to Compete with Apple, VERGE (May 29, 2019, 10:21 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/29/18644045/apple-defends-app-store-policies-antitrust-
eu-spotify [https://perma.cc/QQ7E-Q9KY]. 
 192. See supra Part I.B. 
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into a speaker’s message (known as “compelled speech”) is likely to alter 
that message, the First Amendment vests speakers with discretion to reject 
another’s speech.193  The right to either accept or disfavor a viewpoint is the 
very dynamic sought by Justice Holmes and advanced by modern jurists and 
scholars.194  As such, private actors must enjoy wide latitude to reject 
repugnant, erroneous, and dangerous (or even benign) ideas for two reasons:  
1) it enables speakers to craft their specific messages and 2) it bestows power 
on the market to value ideas. 
This framework has important implications for antitrust law.  Because the 
government is seldom able to restrict political, social, or expressive speech, 
the courts have cloaked actors engaging in political expression with antitrust 
immunity.  The Noerr-Pennington doctrine,195  for example, enables firms to 
lobby or protest legislation even when anticompetitive effects would 
result.196  Courts have similarly ruled that political activity is noncommercial 
and thus beyond antitrust’s scope.197  In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware 
Co.,198 activists boycotted white merchants who refused to serve African-
Americans.  The merchants sued the NAACP to recover losses caused by the 
boycott and to enjoin future boycott activities.199  Although the boycott 
caused economic injury to the merchants, the political context of the 
movement placed the activists beyond antitrust’s reach.200  This suggests that 
the restriction of speech is substantially different than the restriction of output 
 
 193. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Courts 
have recognized a handful of ‘narrow and well-understood exceptions’ to the general rule that 
content-based speech regulations—including compelled speech—are subject to strict 
scrutiny.” (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994))). 
 194. See supra Part I.B. 
 195. See generally United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); 
E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
 196. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 662; In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231, 264 (3d Cir. 
2017) (“‘Rooted in the First Amendment and fears about the threat of chilling political 
speech,’ Noerr-Pennington immunity provides ‘immun[ity] from antitrust liability’ to parties 
‘who petition the government for redress.’  That immunity ‘applies to actions which might 
otherwise violate the Sherman Act because [t]he federal antitrust laws do not regulate the 
conduct of private individuals in seeking anticompetitive action from the government.’” 
(citation omitted) (quoting A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 
250 (3d Cir. 2001))). 
 197. Hillary Greene & Dennis A. Yao, Antitrust as Speech Control, 60 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1215, 1222 (2019) (stating that the determination that activity is political in nature tends 
to demand antitrust immunity). 
 198. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
 199. Id. at 889. 
 200. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 508 (1988) 
(“Although the boycotters intended to inflict economic injury on the merchants, the boycott 
was not motivated by any desire to lessen competition or to reap economic benefits but by the 
aim of vindicating rights of equality and freedom lying at the heart of the Constitution, and 
the boycotters were consumers who did not stand to profit financially from a lessening of 
competition in the boycotted market.”). 
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in product markets.  And indeed, when antitrust and the First Amendment 
collide, antitrust typically loses.201 
By acknowledging the First Amendment right to discriminate against 
speech, the political rhetoric outlined in Part III.B runs into problems.  Any 
interpretation of antitrust law that requires platforms and monopolists to 
forbear suppressing repugnant ideas would likely abridge their right to reject 
speech.  And, indeed, corporations are protected actors under the First 
Amendment.202  So while the marketplace of ideas is often economic—and 
perhaps society would benefit from increased competition among ideas, 
speakers, and information—it is difficult to square how enforcement could 
achieve this end without offending the Constitution. 
Part IV resolves this conundrum.  It argues that information plays such an 
important role in the modern economy that antitrust should, upon making a 
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, protect the flow 
of commercial expression from monopolies and trade restraints.  This would 
modestly reinterpret antitrust precedent whereby enforcement could remedy 
the primary anticompetitive effects of the modern information economy. 
IV.  ANTITRUST’S MOMENT? 
Antitrust can no longer ignore the value of information in today’s markets.  
But rather than advancing all types of speech, antitrust should remedy certain 
instances of abridged commercial expression.  To make this case, Part IV.A 
details the relationship between competition and commercial speech, 
explaining that competition produces commercial information and that 
anticompetitive conduct can suppress it.  And since the First Amendment 
protects commercial speech for the same reasons that antitrust law fosters 
competition—i.e., to enhance market efficiency—antitrust can and should 
treat commercial speech as a benefit of competition.  Part IV.B argues that 
antitrust is ideal for this task, as its limited scope would impose liability on 
firms wielding enough monopoly power to deprive the overall market of 
valuable information.  Part IV.C finds support for this position in antitrust’s 
legislative history and case law.  The sum of these analyses shows that the 
antitrust enterprise should modernize to account for the emerging value of 
commercial information and speech in today’s markets, though it should 
resist rhetoric calling for enforcement to govern social, political, and 
expressive speech. 
 
 201. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Inv’r’s Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 860 
(10th Cir. 1999) (“In our view, the First Amendment does not allow antitrust claims to be 
predicated solely on protected speech.”). 
 202. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339–40 (2010) (ruling that corporations have 
the right to free speech under the First Amendment). 
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A.  Commercial Speech as a Benefit of Competition 
1.  Commercial Speech 
Commercial speech, loosely defined as “expression related solely to the 
economic interests of the speaker and its audience,”203 lacked constitutional 
protection until 1976, when the Supreme Court brought it under the First 
Amendment’s umbrella in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.204  The justification for doing so, according 
to the Court, was that commercial speech “not only serves the economic 
interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal 
interest in the fullest dissemination of information.”205  Although the 
quintessential type of commercial speech is advertising, the First 
Amendment potentially shields other types of economic expression such as 
data, research, and any other speech or information with “plainly commercial 
nature and effect.”206 
Virginia State Board recognizes the vital role that information plays in the 
economy.207  In a competitive market, buyers depend on information to 
determine how much to pay for a good.  After numerous interactions among 
many buyers and sellers, the good’s market price should emerge 
incorporating all relevant information about that good.208  Fueling this 
process is competition; as sellers vie for buyers, they typically disseminate 
information about their product’s utility relative to their competitors’ 
goods.209  Although the market is expected to vest consumers with enough 
data to make rational decisions—as it rewards those who uncover and supply 
valuable information210—markets fail when actors are deprived of 
 
 203. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
 204. 425 U.S. 748, 760 (1976). 
 205. Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 561–62 (“In applying the First Amendment to this 
area, we have rejected the ‘highly paternalistic’ view that government has complete power to 
suppress or regulate commercial speech.” (quoting Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 770)). 
 206. Boelter v. Advance Magazine Publishers Inc., 210 F. Supp. 3d 579, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016) (quoting Conn. Bar Ass’n v. United States, 620 F.3d 81, 95 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
 207. See Michelle N. Comeau, Comment, The Hidden Contradiction Within Insider 
Trading Regulation, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1275, 1295 (2006) (“In its purest form, market 
efficiency is simply a positive description of how a capital market may adapt to information.  
If a capital market is efficient, stock prices should fully reflect all available information.  
Furthermore, the price of shares should immediately adjust to new information that is relevant 
to a stock’s value.  The value of maintaining an efficient market lies in the market’s ability to 
properly allocate investment resources.” (footnote omitted)). 
 208. See Kevin S. Marshall, Free Enterprise and the Rule of Law:  The Political Economy 
of Executive Discretion (Efficiency Implications of Regulatory Enforcement Strategies), 1 
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 235, 262–63 (2010). 
 209. See generally Day & Stemler, supra note 58. 
 210. See Langford v. Rite Aid of Ala., Inc., 231 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000) (“In an 
open market economy, consumers have the appropriate incentives to obtain information about 
acceptable cost of consumer goods, and to make purchases from the retailer who most closely 
matches that price.”). 
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information.211  This is because uninformed consumers are prone to spend 
too much on inferior goods while they fail to purchase better ones, causing 
lackluster firms to flourish while superior businesses flounder.  In fact, 
monopolized markets may result in a lack of firms able to disseminate 
information.212  Given this harm, the Supreme Court has stated that 
commercial speech, representing even an incomplete recitation of the facts, 
may still enhance consumer welfare.213 
Nevertheless, commercial expression is considered less important and thus 
receives less protection than social, political, and expressive speech.214  For 
example, the government wields significant authority to abridge false or 
misleading economic expression since, after all, the utility of commercial 
speech stems from its ability to inform consumers.215  In fact, in contrast to 
unconstitutional types of compelled expressive speech,216 the government 
may require firms and individuals to express forms of commercial speech, 
such as in warning labels, when doing so would increase informational 
accuracy and prevent harm.217  But if commercial expression is accurate (or 
accurate enough), the state may abridge that expression upon overcoming 
intermediate scrutiny.218 
2.  The Proposal 
This section argues that antitrust should treat commercial speech as a 
virtue of competition, given that, first, the nature of competition generates 
market information valued by consumers and, second, anticompetitive 
conduct can suppress it.  In fact, much of the criticism targeting big tech 
stems from the notion that tech firms abuse their market power, resulting in 
restricted commercial information.  According to The Economist, “One of 
the few things that most people in the West agree on is that there is some 
 
 211. See Thomas L. Greaney, Competitive Reform in Health Care:  The Vulnerable 
Revolution, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 179, 205 (1988) (discussing how information asymmetries 
cause economic inefficiency). 
 212. Day & Stemler, supra note 58, at 105 (explaining how market concentration can 
deprive markets of information). 
 213. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980). 
 214. Mass. Ass’n of Private Career Sch. v. Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d 173, 194 (D. Mass. 
2016) (explaining that commercial speech restrictions typically receive intermediate scrutiny). 
 215. Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 563. 
 216. See supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text. 
 217. Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 565–66. 
 218. Id. at 564 (“The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions 
on commercial speech.  Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that 
interest.  The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s goal.  
Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria.  First, the restriction must 
directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides 
only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose.  Second, if the governmental 
interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the 
excessive restrictions cannot survive.”). 
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kind of problem with the big tech firms.”219  But despite the social and 
economic benefits of promoting commercial expression, the obstacle is that 
courts have characterized suppressed speech—commercial or otherwise—as 
beyond antitrust’s scope.220  The following discussion, in revisiting the 
economics of speech, rebuts this precedent. 
The issue is that cases such as DataCell ehf. v. Visa, Inc.221 and 
Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc.222 reject the notion that antitrust must 
specifically promote commercial speech.  In each dispute, the court found 
that exclusionary behavior cannot offend the antitrust laws so long as the 
primary effect is only diminished commercial speech.223  The courts have 
also ruled that seldom, if ever, does the conduct of suppressing speech (rather 
than the effect of exclusionary behavior) rise to the level of being 
anticompetitive, even when consumer welfare suffers.  In Mercatus Group, 
LLC v. Lake Forest Hospital,224 the Seventh Circuit ruled that commercial 
speech, even when it damages competition, lies “outside the reach of the 
antitrust laws.”225  According to Sanderson v. Culligan International Co.,226 
“Commercial speech is not actionable under the antitrust laws.”227  An earlier 
Seventh Circuit opinion—cited in Sanderson—held that “the remedy is not 
antitrust litigation but more speech—the marketplace of ideas.”228 
To cast doubt on whether this mindset is still viable—as the modern 
economy emphasizes ideas, information, and speech as well as the platforms 
through which ideas travel—contemporary firms compete over quality 
without affecting prices (which Part III.A detailed).229  For instance, 
Facebook overtook the social media sites MySpace and Friendster by 
offering a superior, yet similarly free, platform on which users could express 
political, social, and economic views.  It is now common for firms to compete 
over issues of quality, speech, innovation, privacy, and selection rather than 
 
 219. Technology Firms Are Both the Friend and the Foe of Competition, ECONOMIST (Nov. 
15, 2018), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/11/15/technology-firms-are-both-
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 220. Sanderson v. Culligan Int’l Co., 415 F.3d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 221. No. 1:14-CV-1658 GBL/TCB, 2015 WL 4624714 (E.D. Va. July 30, 2015) (finding 
that suppressed speech entailed noncommercial activity even though it caused the plaintiff lost 
profits). 
 222. No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (declaring that 
the suppression of free speech cannot implicate antitrust’s framework without a commercial 
market bearing positive prices). 
 223. See, e.g., DataCell, 2015 WL 4624714, at *7. 
 224. 641 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 225. Id. at 850–51 (“Under circuit precedent, such a territorial admonition to a 
competitor—like other speech made in the commercial context—does not violate the antitrust 
laws unless it leads to an agreement to restrain trade or is accompanied by some sort of 
‘enforcement mechanism’ designed somehow to coerce or compel that competitor to heed the 
admonition.”). 
 226. 415 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 227. Id. at 624. 
 228. Schachar v. Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 400 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 229. See supra Part III.A. 
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prices, implying that antitrust’s fidelity to prices must loosen.230  This 
landscape has, in fact, increased judicial recognition that antitrust should 
remedy exclusively nonprice injuries in more instances,231 even though 
courts do so infrequently in practice.  As such, since a firm can employ 
anticompetitive tactics resulting in suppressed commercial speech without 
producing higher prices, it is critical that the quality of information reaching 
market actors reflects a nonprice element of consumer welfare;232 “non-price 
competition is most important . . . where price competition lacks vigor.”233 
Support for this proposition can be found in the FTC opinion 1-800 
Contacts, Inc.234  In that case, firms in the business of selling contact lenses 
agreed to forego competition for online advertising space.235  This conduct, 
according to the FTC, sought to deprive consumers of information, which 
resulted in higher prices.236  Notable was the opinion’s remark that “[w]hen 
information is withheld from consumers, it frustrates their ability to compare 
 
 230. For example, market forces have supposedly nudged firms to refuse to carry 
competing political views. See, e.g., Kalev Leetaru, Facebook’s Deletion of Warren’s Ad 
Reminds Us It Can Silence Debate About Itself, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2019, 12:23 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2019/03/12/facebooks-deletion-of-warrens-ad-
reminds-us-it-can-silence-debate-about-itself/ [https://perma.cc/C7HE-PKKL].  They have 
also excluded information concerning rival products. See, e.g., Anthony Cuthbertson, Google 
Uses Bizarre Tactics to Dominate Rivals and Confuse Their Customers, Search Engine 
Claims, INDEPENDENT (July 20, 2018, 1:04 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/gadgets-and-tech/news/google-alternatives-privacy-duckduckgo-search-engine-
browser-chrome-eu-fine-a8455321.html [https://perma.cc/4T89-XG8Q] (explaining how 
Google allegedly suppresses information in order to gain a competitive edge over rivals). 
 231. See, e.g., Cobb Theatres III, LLC v. AMC Entm’t Holdings, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 3d 
1319, 1335 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (stating that “quintessential harm is not higher prices; ‘[r]ather, 
consumer welfare’” in the form of “substantially diminished . . . quality” (quoting Jacobs v. 
Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir. 2010))). 
 232. The Third, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits state that antitrust law may 
remedy diminished innovation, quality of goods, and perhaps similar nonprice injuries. See, 
e.g., W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 100–01 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(stating that anticompetitive effects include increased prices, diminished output, and 
diminished quality); HM Compounding Servs., Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc., No. 4:14–CV–
1858 JAR, 2015 WL 4162762, at *8 (E.D. Miss. July 9, 2015) (“Allegations of anti-
competitive effects sufficient to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act include the 
elimination of a market competitor, a decrease in output, reduced consumer choice, and a 
decline in the quality of goods.”); Magnetar Techs. Corp. v. Intamin, Ltd., No. CV 07-1052 
GAF (JWJx), 2011 WL 13133973, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2011); Ginzburg v. Mem’l 
Healthcare Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 998, 1015 (S.D. Tex. 1997); see also Richard D. Cudahy 
& Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 MINN. L. REV. 59, 80 (2010) (discussing whether 
anticompetitive effects such as higher prices or restricted output must be present to establish 
antitrust liability, or if one must only demonstrate harm to competition).  According to the 
Eleventh Circuit, “[A]ctual anticompetitive effects include, but are not limited to, reduction 
of output, increase in price, or deterioration in quality.” Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 
626 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). 
 233. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Antitrust Institute in Support of Appellants and 
Reversal of the District Court’s Decision at 3, FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 
2011) (Nos. 10-3458 & 10-3459) (“That is to say, the court found as a fact that these products 
compete head to head on the basis of quality.”). 
 234. F.T.C. No. 9372 (Nov. 7, 2018). 
 235. Id. at 1. 
 236. Id. at 11. 
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the prices and offerings of competitors.”237  Although this case turned on 
conventional indicators of exclusionary behavior—i.e., higher prices—it 
illustrates the manner in which restricting commercial information can 
generate an anticompetitive effect flowing from exclusionary behavior. 
In fact, antitrust is the ideal body of law to promote commercial speech 
due to its fixation on systemic harms.238  To establish a claim under either 
section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act, as explained earlier, the typical defendant 
must have exercised market power,239 excluded competition, and generated 
an anticompetitive effect.  By requiring each element, the courts have sought 
to redress situations where the market cannot self-correct for the 
monopolist’s restraints.  The purpose of doing so is to scrutinize monopolists 
who have caused systemic injuries rather than subjecting small businesses to 
liability.240  In turn, to assess whether an act of abridged commercial speech 
diminished consumer welfare, courts should search for a market failure of 
ideas.241  Key is whether consumers would have benefited from certain 
speech but for the anticompetitive conduct.242  Implementing this standard 
would remain faithful to antitrust’s framework in requiring evidence not that 
the individual speaker was injured but that the monopolist deprived the 
market of commercial speech or information valued by consumers.243  If two 
platforms suppress information about rival products, this could be an antitrust 
offense when the deprivation leads consumers to select products they 
otherwise would not have.  Restricting the output of commercial information 
would, after all, have a conventionally anticompetitive effect—e.g., 
artificially high prices—or would diminish consumer welfare in ways that 
affect the market’s quality. 
 
 237. Id. at 2. 
 238. La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Shire LLC (In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig.), 754 F.3d 
128, 133 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining that antitrust liability under the Sherman Act “requires, in 
addition to the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, ‘the willful acquisition 
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence 
of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident’” (quoting Verizon Commc’ns 
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004))); United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 74–75 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (determining first that the conduct was 
exclusionary behavior but then stating that, to violate antitrust laws, the conduct must have 
produced an anticompetitive effect). 
 239. Market power is a required element of a section 2 claim.  Under section 1, restraint of 
trade does not necessarily require market power.  However, due to the difficulty of proving 
that a restraint harmed consumer welfare, the courts accept evidence that the defendant 
possessed market power to prove indirectly that the challenged restraint was anticompetitive. 
 240. See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 77, 138 (explaining that remedying anticompetitive conduct that causes decline of 
systemic economic indicators, or market failure, is the goal of antitrust law). 
 241. Aerotec Int’l, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1137 (D. Ariz. 2014) 
(“The purpose of antitrust law is not to protect market participants from the market; it is to 
protect the public from market failure.”), aff’d, 836 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 242. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 778 (1999) (“Claims about quality or patient 
comfort would have a procompetitive effect by preventing misleading or false claims that 
distort the market.”). 
 243. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 333 (1990). 
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By doing so, antitrust enforcement could remedy the chief anticompetitive 
effects of the information economy, which, as critics note, currently lie 
beyond enforcement’s reach.244  For example, Google allegedly abuses its 
position in the online advertising market as AdSense’s parent company.245  
Critics contend that Google—by controlling the contours of internet 
advertising such as placement, color, and font—dictates how or whether 
other firms can speak.246  This is because the conduct, by shielding Google’s 
market share from competition, deprives consumers of the benefits of 
commercial information as they navigate online markets.  Although antitrust 
authorities in the European Union have condemned this practice,247 firms in 
the United States have so far been able to manipulate advertising without 
incurring antitrust liability.248  Indeed, the FTC publicly refused to initiate an 
action against Google’s ad practices.249 
Or recall that firms may abridge information about rival products in 
favoring their own goods250—a practice that the FTC concluded in 2013 does 
not violate antitrust law despite its effects.  According to the FTC:  
“Undoubtedly, Google took aggressive actions to gain advantage over rival 
search providers.  However, the FTC’s mission is to protect competition, and 
not individual competitors.  The evidence did not demonstrate that Google’s 
actions in this area stifled competition in violation of U.S. law.”251  The 
FTC’s position, though, fails to scrutinize whether consumers were, in fact, 
injured by Google’s conduct, as the agency only accounted for price effects.  
If the manipulation of commercial information flowing from exclusionary 
 
 244. See generally Khan, supra note 40. 
 245. Binder, supra note 50 (describing the liability incurred by Google in Europe for 
anticompetitive practices in the advertising market). 
 246. Bill Chappell, EU Fines Google $1.7 Billion over “Abusive” Online Ad Strategies, 
NPR (Mar. 20, 2019, 1:25 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/20/705106450/eu-fines-google-
1-7-billion-over-abusive-online-ad-strategies [https://perma.cc/Z2TH-E24T]. 
 247. Google “denied other companies the possibility to compete on the merits and to 
innovate—and consumers the benefits of competition.” Harper Neidig, EU Fines Google 
$1.7B over Advertising Agreements, HILL (Mar. 20, 2019, 7:41 AM), 
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/434859-eu-fines-google-17-billion-over-advertising-
agreements [https://perma.cc/32SU-JJ4C] (quoting Margrethe Vestager, the European 
Union’s competition commissioner). 
 248. Chappell, supra note 246. 
 249. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of the Federal Trade Commission 
Regarding Google’s Search Practices In the Matter of Google Inc. (Jan. 3, 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statement-commission-
regarding-googles-search-practices/130103brillgooglesearchstmt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BU37-8CU6]; Sam Gustin, U.S. Google Antitrust Probe Spurs Internet-
Regulation Debate, TIME (Oct. 15, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/10/15/ftc-antitrust-
probe-against-google-sets-up-internet-regulation-clash/ [https://perma.cc/VR4J-UV4E] 
(explaining the weakness in the antitrust case against Google’s ad practices). 
 250. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text (describing the allegations that Google 
suppresses commercial speech). 
 251. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices 
to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns in the Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games 
and Tablets, and in Online Search (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2013/01/google-agrees-change-its-business-practices-resolve-ftc 
[https://perma.cc/4T2E-F625]. 
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conduct caused consumers to select products they otherwise would not have 
chosen—essentially creating a qualitatively inferior market for consumers—
this indicates that the restriction of commercial information or speech should 
equate to restricting output in a product market.  Or consider that firms in 
innovation sectors may suppress the R&D of rival companies, conduct which 
might not offend antitrust law until the R&D generates a tangible good or 
service.252  Although most courts and commentators acknowledge that 
innovation affects consumer welfare, the point is that enforcement should 
account for early stages of intellectual development before the R&D 
constitutes “future competition.”253  Enforcement should thus scrutinize 
whether a monopolist has, in abusing its dominant position, deprived 
consumers and markets of valuable commercial information. 
In important part, antitrust’s requirement of market power should assuage 
concerns that enforcement would impose liability on small businesses, 
individuals, and other nonmonopolists.  This is because, without market 
power, one’s effort to suppress speech would lack efficacy, as other forums 
could carry the content if it bore merit.  The proposed test—drawn from the 
DOJ and FTC’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines—considers whether 
consumers could find the abridged speech on a reasonably interchangeable 
platform.254  If, for instance, a minor platform excluded information about a 
product but a major platform such as Amazon could carry it, this should not 
offend antitrust law, since consumer welfare would likely remain unaffected.  
This is analogous to a gas station that raises its prices above the market rate—
so long as competition exists without exclusionary conduct on behalf of the 
gas station, no anticompetitive effect would exist because the elevated prices 
should invite competition.  As such, the only firms that could commit the 
proposed offense would necessarily control a primary forum for speech or 
ideas, including Facebook, Google, or AT&T.  And even if a monopolist 
excluded competition resulting in suppressed commercial content, a court 
would still review the exclusionary act under the “rule of reason” test 
 
 252. Gregory R. Day & Michael Schuster, Patent Inequality, 71 ALA. L. REV. 115, 150 
(2019). 
 253. Government antitrust enforcers have referred to innovation as “future competition.” 
Andre Barlow, Mergers That Diminish Innovation Present Deal Risk, ANTITRUST LAW. BLOG 
(May 7, 2015), https://www.antitrustlawyerblog.com/mergers-that-raise-future-competition-
concerns-present-deal-risk/ [https://perma.cc/RH69-CQ6T] (“The Antitrust Division’s 
statement indicates that the transaction was blocked because the combination would have 
diminished innovation.  In other words, the Antitrust Division was concerned about the 
potential loss of head to head competition in the development of future cutting-edge 
semiconductor products and made no allegation that the combined firm would have 
monopolized any existing or actual product market.  The Antitrust Division’s tough stance 
against [the merger] indicates that it is willing to scrutinize and challenge deals that raise 
longer-term anticompetitive concerns related to future competition even if there is no past 
pricing evidence that may predict that the merger will result in higher prices regarding actual 
products.”). 
 254. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 7 
(2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/38ZF-K483].  The Horizontal Merger Guidelines evaluate market definition 
based on “consumers’ ability and willingness to substitute away from one product to another 
in response to a price increase.” Id. 
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whereby the defendant may present evidence that the conduct was, on 
balance, procompetitive.255 
This proposal, however, raises constitutional concerns because one’s right 
to exclude speech is an important element of the First Amendment.  The 
following analysis notes that the distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial speech resolves this issue. 
3.  Practical and Constitutional Issues Resolved 
The integration of commercial speech into antitrust’s framework would 
avoid burdening the First Amendment while simultaneously advancing 
antitrust’s purpose.  Even in light of the protections conferred by the First 
Amendment, antitrust has authority to promote commercial speech since its 
value stems from informing consumers in making economic decisions.256  It 
can, in fact, compel forms of commercial speech, such as a warning or 
disclosure labels, when doing so serves important societal functions.257  But 
when an act of commercial expression causes consumers to become less 
informed, the speech loses utility and, accordingly, a degree of constitutional 
protection.258  In ES Development, Inc. v. RWM Enterprises, Inc.,259 a group 
of auto dealers argued that their statements persuading manufacturers into 
entering an anticompetitive pact were shielded by the First Amendment.  The 
Eighth Circuit disagreed, remarking that antitrust may “impose certain 
restrictions upon the commercial speech of individual entities which have 
violated the Sherman Act.”260  The implication is that antitrust may promote 
and govern commercial expression, notwithstanding the right to reject speech 
under the First Amendment. 
Such an embrace of free speech should, however, end at commercial 
speech.  In terms of noncommercial speech, it is important that social, 
political, and expressive speech remain beyond antitrust’s reach because the 
right to reject unsavory (or even benign) content is a core function of the First 
Amendment.261  There is indeed no practical or effective way to condemn 
censorship while also permitting platforms to ban vile content.  Antitrust 
should remain a strictly economic body of law to avoid unpredictable 
liability.  Otherwise, liability might attach whenever a platform enforces its 
terms of services against repugnant speech.  This suggests again that plans to 
 
 255. King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 3d 402, 412 (E.D. Pa. 2015) 
(explaining the rule of reason test whereby exclusionary conduct does not violate antitrust law 
if the defendant offers sufficient procompetitive rationales for it). 
 256. Boelter v. Advance Magazine Publishers Inc., 210 F. Supp. 3d 579, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016) (describing the informative utility of commercial speech). 
 257. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 466 (1978). 
 258. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (remarking that the 
government may regulate “false, deceptive, or misleading” speech notwithstanding the First 
Amendment). 
 259. 939 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 260. Id. at 557. 
 261. Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 592–93 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (reviewing the 
importance of allowing speakers to craft their own messages), aff’d sub nom. Stuart v. 
Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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incorporate noncommercial speech into enforcement are misguided.  The 
courts and Congress must therefore reject calls to condemn firms that have 
abridged social or political speech so as to avoid eroding the First 
Amendment as well as antitrust law. 
One can find support for this proposal from antitrust’s legislative history 
and distant case law.  Recall that antitrust’s scope was defined by its 
legislative history whereby Congress supposedly had the singular purpose of 
promoting economic objectives.  The next section finds, however, that the 
protection of commercial speech comports with this record and, as a result, 
should constitute one of antitrust’s goals. 
B.  Judicial and Historical Support 
1.  Antitrust’s Legislative History 
Even if one accepts that antitrust can only redress economic problems, 
comments by those who drafted the Sherman Act indicate that the drafters 
sought to condemn a broader array of economic injuries—including 
diminished commercial speech.  Recall that Bork’s review of antitrust’s 
legislative history persuaded the courts to narrow antitrust’s scope to 
remedying only certain types of economic injuries such as high prices.262  In 
this sense, history is critical to assessing antitrust’s boundaries.  The 
following analysis revisits this record, finding that antitrust’s drafters enacted 
the Sherman Act to prevent powerful trusts from imposing undefined harms 
affecting economic and social inequality.  Matters of fairness and justice are 
essential.  So, when considering the role of information in modern markets, 
these debates indicate that the abridgment of commercial speech should 
entail an anticompetitive effect even when consumer prices remain low. 
Consider the lack of specificity used by the drafters in describing 
antitrust’s remedial goals.  According to Senator John Sherman, the hallmark 
of an illegal arrangement was one that allows the monopolist to “control the 
market, raise or lower prices, as will best promote its selfish interests.”263  
The drafters expressed similar concerns that uncompetitive markets generate 
inequalities of “social order,” “condition,” and “opportunity” as well as 
wealth.264  To them, market power created more injuries involving economic 
inequality than supracompetitive prices.  They described monopolists as 
exercising a “kingly prerogative” over “the necessaries of life.”265  And since 
Congress intended antitrust law to govern the widest array of activities 
qualifying as trade or commerce,266 legislative history indicates that the 
 
 262. See supra notes 102–04 (describing the reformation of antitrust law based on Bork’s 
historical analysis). 
 263. 21 CONG. REC. 2455, 2457 (1890) (emphasis added). 
 264. Id. at 2460. 
 265. Id. at 2457 (“If we will not endure a king as a political power we should not endure a 
king over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of life.”). 
 266. See Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 569 n.6 
(1982) (“Congress intended that the antitrust laws be given broad, remedial effect.”). 
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drafters believed that enforcement should condemn a greater spectrum of 
economic injuries than it currently does, especially considering the waning 
relevance of prices. 
In fact, even though the Sherman Act can only govern trade and commerce 
via its literal text, legislative history suggests that enforcement may redress 
the social ills created by monopolies and trade restraints—especially 
involving matters of inequality.267  Consider the broad language used by 
Senator Sherman in discussing the types of harms that antitrust should 
proscribe:  “If the natural effects of [anticompetitive behavior] . . . produce 
evil results, if their policy is denounced by the law as against the common 
good, it may be restrained, [and] punished.”268  Along the same lines, firms 
acting in concert tend to “encourage immoral and injurious pursuits” but 
when a company competes “on equal terms,” it “can not be dangerous.”269  
During their debates, the drafters also said that antitrust law should sanction 
trusts when “the act to be done has a ‘necessary tendency’ to ‘prejudice the 
public’ or to oppress individuals.”270  Senator Sherman noted further, rather 
than limiting enforcement to any singular goal, he sought for the courts to 
define antitrust’s parameters.271  Antitrust was thus motivated by undefined 
principles of social and economic welfare and focused on the power of large 
corporations to oppress consumers.272 
Notable scholars have reached this same conclusion.  Wu remarked that 
“[n]o other scholar ever managed to find what Bork did in the Congressional 
record.”273  According to Maurice Stucke and Allen Grunes’s research on 
speech markets, antitrust’s architects were concerned about social and 
democratic principles as well as prices.274  Daniel Crane, who sought to 
defend Bork, nevertheless agreed with detractors that Bork’s analysis was 
“disingenuous.”275  Criticism of Bork’s analysis of legislative history has 
even come from the esteemed Herbert Hovenkamp.276 
As such, legislative history suggests that the concept of consumer welfare 
should span more types of economic goals than are currently pursued.  Since 
the drafters enacted a body of law meant to remedy the exploitation of 
concentrated market power resulting in heightened economic inequalities, 
 
 267. 21 CONG. REC. 2455–56 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 2457. 
 270. Id. at 2459. 
 271. Id. at 2460 (“I admit that it is difficult to define in legal language the precise line 
between lawful and unlawful combinations.  This must be left for the courts to determine in 
each particular case.  All that we, as lawmakers, can do is to declare general principles.”). 
 272. Id. at 2457 (“It only deals with unlawful combinations, unlawful by the code of any 
law of any civilized nation of ancient or modern times.”). 
 273. TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS:  ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 89 (2018). 
 274. Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69 
ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 258–60 (2001). 
 275. Crane, supra note 103, at 836 (describing problems in Bork’s analysis). 
 276. Id. at 841 (“Herbert Hovenkamp has asserted that ‘Bork’s analysis of the legislative 
history was strained, heavily governed by his own ideological agenda . . . .  Not a single 
statement in the legislative history comes close to stating the conclusions that Bork drew.’” 
(quoting Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 22 (1989))). 
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the anticompetitive effects derived from the suppression of commercial 
speech should espouse a remedial goal of antitrust enforcement.  The next 
discussion explores case law that also shows that antitrust is equipped to 
promote commercial speech and that doing so would benefit consumers and 
markets. 
2.  Case Law from Antitrust’s Prior Era 
Precedent established at the time of, and before, antitrust’s reformation—
when antitrust had the authority to condemn a vaster array of injuries—
indicates that consumers would benefit if antitrust promoted commercial 
speech.277  Consider the position staked by the Supreme Court in FTC v. 
Indiana Federation of Dentists in 1986.278  A group of rival dentists entered 
into an agreement whereby they refused to submit dental x-rays to insurance 
companies.  According to the FTC, this conduct credibly reduced the quality 
of dental care in the market but seemingly had no effect on prices.279  
Although the Court noted the potential pricing effects, as consumers would 
likely venture down costly avenues to obtain their x-rays,280 the opinion 
asserted that the deprivation of information valued by consumers could 
potentially erode consumer choice or market quality in violation of the 
antitrust laws.281 
A few cases scrutinized business restraints of free speech in general, 
implying that the narrower topic of commercial speech would benefit from 
antitrust review.  In 1945, the DOJ alleged that the Associated Press (AP) 
violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by forbidding its writers from 
selling AP stories to outside writers as well as admitting new members into 
its ranks.282  Justice Hugo Black, writing for the Court in Associated Press v. 
 
 277. See generally Sandeep Vaheesan, The Evolving Populisms of Antitrust, 93 NEB. L. 
REV. 370 (2014) (explaining the evolution of antitrust from the pursuit of expansive populist 
goals to a more narrow economic doctrine). 
 278. 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
 279. Id. at 459 (“The Federation’s policy takes the form of a horizontal agreement among 
the participating dentists to withhold from their customers a particular service that they 
desire—the forwarding of x rays to insurance companies along with claim forms.”). 
 280. Id. (“A refusal to compete with respect to the package of services offered to customers, 
no less than a refusal to compete with respect to the price term of an agreement, impairs the 
ability of the market to advance social welfare by ensuring the provision of desired goods and 
services to consumers at a price approximating the marginal cost of providing them.  Absent 
some countervailing procompetitive virtue—such as, for example, the creation of efficiencies 
in the operation of a market or the provision of goods and services.”). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 4 (1945) (“The heart of the 
government’s charge was that appellants had by concerted action set up a system of By-Laws 
which prohibited all AP members from selling news to non-members, and which granted each 
member powers to block its non-member competitors from membership.  These By-Laws, to 
which all AP members had assented, were, in the context of the admitted facts, charged to be 
in violation of the Sherman Act.”). 
1356 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
United States,283 ruled that the AP had monopolized the news, which 
“stifle[d] competition” as well as “restrained” the quality of journalism.284 
Interestingly, the AP insisted that it had the constitutional right to exclude 
nonmembers and disseminate content in the manner of its choosing.285  The 
First Amendment, according to the AP, precludes laws that interfere with 
journalistic discretion.286  The Court rejected this argument, stating that 
condemning restraints of speech promotes the very ideals sought by the 
Constitution.287  Since the First Amendment is intended to foster competition 
in the marketplace of ideas, Justice Black insisted the Sherman Act 
complements the Constitution: 
[The First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is 
essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a 
free society.  Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede 
the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a 
refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed 
freedom.  Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some.  
Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to 
combine to keep others from publishing is not.  Freedom of the press from 
governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction 
repression of that freedom by private interests.288 
Similarly, in 1951, the Supreme Court in Lorain Journal Co. v. United 
States289 reviewed an antitrust lawsuit against a newspaper called the Lorain 
Journal.290  At issue was the journal’s attempt to “destroy” an upstart radio 
station that threatened its local monopoly.291  The journal sought to starve 
the radio station of revenue by prohibiting the journal’s advertisers from also 
advertising with the radio station.292  Even though this strategy restrained 
competition, the journal claimed it had the right to do so under the First 
Amendment.293  The Supreme Court disagreed, remarking that the journal 
may not use, in the name of free speech, its market power to eliminate speech 
and expression.294  In so many words, the Sherman Act achieves the very 
goals enshrined by the First Amendment. 
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This Part traced the economics of commercial speech in today’s markets 
and found that antitrust must consider the dissemination of market 
information to be a form of competition.  Doing so is imperative considering 
the current inability of antitrust to remedy the consequences of monopoly 
power in the technology industries.  By focusing only on commercial speech, 
the above proposal would also comport with antitrust’s framework while 
avoiding constitutional tension. Further, the integration of commercial 
speech into antitrust’s scope provides a resolution to recent debates 
concerning antitrust enforcement of all kinds of speech, which are discussed 
in greater detail in Part V. 
V.  ALTERNATIVE PLANS 
The notion that powerful technology companies pose a harm to free speech 
has incensed politicians, commentators, and scholars.  The antitrust solutions 
suggested by them generally involve the government’s power to break up 
trusts, block mergers, and regulate big tech as an essential utility.  Given this 
rhetoric, this Part briefly reviews alternative plans to rein in big tech in light 
of the instant proposal. 
A.  Break Up Big Tech? 
Threats to free speech have prompted policymakers to demand big tech’s 
breakup.  2020 presidential candidate Senator Warren, for instance, proposes 
unwinding Amazon, Google, Facebook, and other tech giants who have 
“bulldozed competition.”295  Former Labor Secretary Robert Reich called for 
a similar divestiture, observing that tech giants have degraded political 
discourse by silencing critics.296  According to Wu, the funneling of speech 
through a small number of platforms imperils democratic and social welfare 
and “[t]he simplest way to break up the power of Facebook is by breaking up 
Facebook.”297  It may thus come as little surprise that editorial spaces are 
commonly filled with proposals to break up big tech.298 
Historical examples of trust-busting include the breakups of Standard Oil, 
AT&T, and J. P. Morgan’s Northern Securities Co.299  In each case, 
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government regulators determined that the monopolist had accrued market 
power via illegal means and created an anticompetitive landscape.300  The 
government then divested the monopolist of discrete business wings so as to 
increase competition.  “Bad conduct, coupled with size, warranted 
divestiture,” which spawned over fifty similar antitrust actions following 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States.301  But with the 
government’s increasing focus on merger policy, divestures are currently 
reserved for only the most extreme cases.302 
Despite calls to “bust” big tech, few detailed plans exist. Senator Warren’s 
plan is an outlier.  She would break up tech giants “even if they are generally 
providing good service at a reasonable price.”303  Her proposal would label 
a tech firm as a “platform utilit[y]” if it generates more than $25 billion in 
revenue per year.304  Companies fitting this description, such as Facebook 
and Amazon, would be prohibited from owning a platform while also 
competing on it.305  For instance, “Google’s ad exchange and businesses on 
the exchange would be split apart, and Google search would have to be spun 
off.”306 
Policymakers should resist grand-scale breakups in favor of the remedies 
proposed earlier in this Article.  Even Barry Lynn, a leading critic of big tech, 
asserted that “[t]he answer is not to break Google or Amazon up.”307  The 
issue is that tech industries are prone to high levels of market concentration 
given their reliance on network effects.308  Consumers of a social media 
platform, for instance, benefit as a platform’s network grows with additional 
users.  Once the platform achieves a critical size, it becomes almost 
impossible for upstart companies to replicate the dominant firm’s network—
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i.e., network effects.309  As an example, users would likely prefer one 
Facebook to six smaller platforms equaling Facebook’s cumulative size.310  
Thus, since market power is thought to accumulate naturally in 
communication and technology sectors, it seems unrealistic to expect big 
tech’s breakup to produce lasting benefits.311  That said, others have arrived 
at the opposite conclusion.312 
It seems that the more effective remedy would involve litigating individual 
instances of suppressed commercial speech under section 1 or 2 of the 
Sherman Act.  Creating liability following an injury should incentivize tech 
giants to manage their market power responsibly or, otherwise, the remedy 
proposed herein would be available.  Doing so would also avoid condemning 
a firm by mere virtue of its size—especially considering the consumer 
benefits of free services—which would allow tech giants to exist so long as 
they avoid suppressing information that results in market failure.  And since 
market power may naturally arise in the information sectors, it would be 
shortsighted to break up each monopoly that periodically emerges. 
Another reason to forgo breaking up tech giants is that their monopoly 
power may not be as formidable as currently thought.313  For instance, 
commentators doubted whether any company could ever challenge MySpace 
right before Facebook vanquished it.314  In fact, Facebook has already lost 
the attention of millennials and Generation Z to Snapchat and other rising 
platforms.315  And given the rapid development of technology, it is perhaps 
myopic to assume that any tech giant can remain a monopolist for long.  In 
light of this reality, divestiture proposals might serve as better political 
rhetoric than policy.  The superior way to promote consumer welfare would 
thus entail a targeted remedy under the Sherman Act rather than a seismic 
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condemnation of firms offering free services.  The next section turns to 
merger policy under the Clayton Act. 
B.  Merger Enforcement 
This Article, in analyzing free speech under the Sherman Act, has so far 
sidestepped the Clayton Act’s authority to regulate corporate mergers.  The 
Clayton Act316 vests the FTC and the DOJ with the ability to block mergers 
that substantially diminish competition.317  This occurs when two or more 
companies combine in a manner to create an overly concentrated market.318  
In terms of speech, the debate has concerned whether antitrust regulators 
should subject media mergers to heightened scrutiny. Presently, however, 
antitrust enforcers give no primacy to whether or how a proposed 
combination is likely to affect the marketplace of ideas.319  It is argued here 
that promoting commercial speech as a qualitative goal of the Sherman Act, 
as raised in Part IV, should likewise become a part of merger policy. 
For context, Wu argued that merger enforcement has badly veered off 
course by fixating on prices to the neglect of social issues.320  To him, few 
societal benefits arise from combinations among tech giants such as 
Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram or WhatsApp.  In fact, AT&T’s 
combination with Time Warner was “the kind of merger the law clearly 
intended to block.”  Yet it survived after overcoming questions of whether 
consumers would pay an additional forty-five cents per month—
demonstrating the importance of prices in the typical antitrust review.321  
Stucke and Grunes have similarly argued that, since media acquisitions may 
reduce the diversity of ideas in communication sectors, merger enforcement 
should promote competition in this industry even when prices remain 
stable.322  After all, the diversity and quality of such services “may be more 
important to consumers than ordinary price competition.”323  The federal 
antitrust agencies appear sympathetic to this argument and note that they 
might consider increasing the scrutiny paid to media combinations.324 
Considering the modern economic value of ideas and speech, merger 
enforcement should block combinations that would qualitatively degrade 
commercial speech in any industry—rather than just in media sectors.  Note 
that merger policy under the Clayton Act tends to forecast consumer harms 
rather than condemn actual injuries as under the Sherman Act.  Indeed, while 
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those who control a platform of speech might appear to pose a minor threat 
to speech—as they provide only the forum—observers contend that tech 
giants can and do determine which competitors can speak and how loudly.325  
To account for the speculative nature of this task, merger enforcers should 
treat commercial speech as a qualitative element of competition by focusing 
on power and incentives:  they should review whether the surviving firm 
would gain not only the power to impair the flow of commercial information 
but also the incentives to do so.  For instance, Google’s acquisitions of 
AdMob and DoubleClick might have vested Google with not only an 
abundance of power over the display and flow of commercial advertising but 
also the incentives to exploit this power in a manner favoring the products it 
sells.326  This harm remains true even if the merger is unlikely to alter prices, 
considering the array of firms that offer consumers free services yet claim 
the power to suppress speech.  Merger analysis should thus inquire into 
whether the combination would reduce the number of platforms of 
expression, creating incentives for the surviving firms to diminish the quality 
and diversity of commercial information passing through those channels. 
Although this Article has primarily explored the Sherman Act, merger 
enforcement should likewise consider commercial speech and ideas to entail 
a qualitative element of competition.  Since the agencies must predict a 
merger’s anticompetitive effects, they should analyze whether increased 
market concentration would encourage, not just empower, the surviving firm 
to quash commercial speech regardless of industry.  The next section reviews 
similar proposals made with respect to the “essential facilities” doctrine. 
C.  Essential Facilities 
An intriguing means of protecting free speech comes via antitrust’s 
essential facilities doctrine.  Although firms seldom have a duty to enhance 
their rivals’ ability to compete, a controversial exception arises when a 
monopolist denies the use a facility that is necessary for competition in a 
specific market.327  A stadium is generally considered an essential facility 
because its availability is required for one to operate a professional team.328  
The test of whether an actor has violated this doctrine consists of four 
elements:  1) control of the essential facility; 2) a competitor’s inability, 
practically or reasonably, to duplicate the essential facility; 3) the denial of 
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the use of the facility to a competitor; and 4) the feasibility of providing the 
facility.329  Evidence suggests that the courts should apply the essential 
facilities doctrine to speech platforms. 
Courts’ increasing hostility to the essential facilities doctrine presents an 
obstacle.330  It is considered fairly audacious to require that firms lend their 
property to rivals for the sake of aiding those rivals.331  Scholars have even 
noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has in dicta refused to confirm whether 
the essential facilities doctrine remains good law.332  Given this landscape, 
the odds that lower courts—much less the Supreme Court—might expand 
the essential facilities doctrine to include platforms of speech is very low. 
Nevertheless, scholars, observers, and even a few courts333 have seized on 
this doctrine’s promise as a mechanism to promote speech.334  YouTube, for 
example, so commands the video-sharing market that it can exclude 
viewpoints and ideas from this medium.335  As one observer stated, 
“Google’s consistent violations of search neutrality, as well as its abuse of 
monopoly power, make the essential facilities doctrine the ideal manner in 
which to regulate Google and better protect consumers.”336  Similar tech 
firms that may control an essential facility include, but are not limited to, 
Amazon, Apple, and Facebook.337  In these circumstances, scholars have 
argued that the denial of an essential facility involved in the trade of speech 
or information should violate antitrust law. 
This Article joins the skeptics of the essential facilities doctrine in at least 
the context of speech.  The issue, beyond the Supreme Court’s hostility to it, 
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is that a speech platform may fail to qualify as “indispensable”338 for 
competition.339  Courts have also sought to apply the doctrine only where the 
challenged conduct lacks any justification—such as a per se violation of 
antitrust law.  Yet with speech, a court would likely assess the act’s 
procompetitive justification, which makes the doctrine a poor fit.340  Further, 
the doctrine depends on whether the monopolist refused to share the facility.  
Yet a monopolist like Google cannot possibly share the top search result 
spot.341  The point is that the essential facilities doctrine presents an initially 
tempting solution, but its flaws are greater than its promise. 
Given these realities, it makes more sense to emphasize tenable solutions.  
In contrast to the essential facilities doctrine, the argument made in this 
Article benefits from modern inertia.  Even though it was traditionally 
difficult to premise an antitrust violation on reduced quality, the rise of 
nonprice goods has seemingly caused the courts to rethink whether 
supracompetitive prices are a de facto requirement of antitrust liability.342  In 
light of this movement, and the deterioration of the essential facilities 
doctrine, the better solution is to foster commercial speech as a qualitative 
aspect of competition under the Sherman Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Since private conduct lies outside of the First Amendment, individuals and 
firms may abridge speech without implicating the Constitution.  The issue is 
that corporations in the information sectors have incentives to manipulate or 
degrade commercial discourse.  This Article argues that the Sherman Act 
should, contrary to modern precedent, proscribe trade restraints that impair 
commercial speech.  It is key that modern firms in the technology, 
innovation, media, and platform industries compete over ideas, speech, and 
information rather than priced, tangible goods.  This casts doubt on antitrust’s 
current approach.  To improve this framework, antitrust should impose 
liability when a monopolist has unreasonably deprived consumers of 
commercial information and created a market failure of ideas.  Further, 
adoption of this proposal would protect the right of private parties to 
discriminate against repugnant ideas notwithstanding popular calls for 
antitrust to regulate all types of political and social expression.  Thus, in light 
of the modern value of ideas and speech, antitrust’s ability to promote the 
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marketplace of ideas would achieve the precise goals sought by modern 
competition laws. 
